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What happened  in Colombia  shows  how  a well-managed  family
planning  program  is more  likely  to succeed  when the women  in
a country already want fewer children  - so that women are
motivated  to control fertility. In such a country, introducing
family planning services simply facilitates and speeds up a
fertility  decline that would tend to occur anyway,  albeit more
slowly.
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By the early 1960s,  Colombia  was  one of the fastest  changes  in social  attitudes  - Merrick  proposes  that
growing  countries  in the world. With  a total fertility  soap operas  promoted  small  families  and women  with
rate of seven  children  per woman and  rapidly  decini-  fewer  children  - Colombian  women's ideal number
ing mortality,  its population  was growing  3.2 percent  of children  decreased  rapidly.
a year, a rate that would  double  the population  every
22 years.  Market  costs, which  were high in the early 1960s,
decreased  rapidly  when  Profamilia  was created.
But that  population  growth  rate  slowed  down  Colombian  women  already wanted  to limit  the
dramatically  in the years 1973-85:  to 1.7  percent,  or a  number  of children  they had,  so psychic  costs for
doubling  time  of 41 years.  This  slowdown,  caused  by  family  planning  were low. The only thing  needed  to
a dramatic  decline  in fertility,  was one  of the most  produce  a rapid  decline  in fertility  was inexpensive,
rapid  fertility  transitions  in the world. The  causes  and  easily  available  contraceptive  devices.  Profamilia  and
mechanisms  for this phenomenon  deserve  to be  the government  took  responsibility  for supplying  the
carefully  studied  if the experience  is to  be replicated  family  planning  services  and did it efficiently.
in other  countries.
Social  processes  are rarely  created  by policy,
To analyze  the fertility  change  in Colombia,  Rofman  concludes.  Profamilia's  activities  facilitated
Rofman uses  a framework  developed  by Richard  Colombia's  fertility  transition,  but did not create the
Easterlin  - which  considers  how socioeconomic  social,  economic,  and cultural  forces  behind  the
changes  affect the supply of and demand  for  children  fertility  decline.  Governments  or nongovernment
and the costs of regulation.  organizations  can encourage  or slow down social
processes,  but if the social  climate is unsupportive,
Rofman  concludes  that family  planning  suc-  individual  behavior  will not change.
ceeded  in Colombia  chiefly  because  there was  already
relatively  low  demand  for children  when  family  The rates  of urbanization  and educational
planning  was introduced  - the average  desired  improvement  have  been similar  in most other  Latin
family  size was already 11 percent  below  the fertility  American  countries  so Rofman  concludes  that there  is
rate in the early 1970s.  Surveys  showed  t.hat  urban  no reason  to expect  other  Latin American  countries  to
women  wanted  fewer children  than  rural women,  and  resist family  planninig  more than  Colombia.  Indeed,
more  educated  women wanted  fewer children  than  the Catholic  church,  a bastion  of resistance  to family
less  educated  women.  planning,  is generally  stronger  in Colombia  than
elsewhere.  What  places  Colombia  apart from the
So  the psychic  costs of fertility  decline  were  other Latin  American  countries  is Profamilia  and the
already low  - perhaps  because  the Catholic  church  attitude  of the Colombian  govemment,  which  -
did not have as much influence  on personal  behavior  while  not encouraging  the use of contraceptives  -
as expected.  And cultural  patterns  did not oppose  did not obstruct  the efforts  of private  organizations  to
changing  and modernizing  behavior,  but actually  do so.
encouraged  them.  Whether  or not the media  promoted
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By the early 1960s, Colombia was one of the fastest growing countries in
the world. With a total fertility rate of 7 children per woman and a rapidly
'.eclining mortality, its population was growing at 3.2% a year, a rate  that
wvould  double the population size every 22 years. The growth rate was 1.7%
for the years 1973-1985, a doubling time of 41 years. This slowdown  in
growth, caused by a dramatic decline in fertility, was one of the most rapid
demographic transition  processes in the world. The causes and mechanisms
of this phenomena deserve to be carefully studied if the experience is to be
replicated in other countries.
A framework developed by Richard Easterlin  is used in this  study to
analyze the fertility change in Colombia. Considering the effects of socio-
economic  changes on supply of and demand for children, together with
effects on regulation costs, this framework will allow us to understand  the
underlying causes and processes behind the ferelity  decline.
A combination of low demand for children and efficient family planning
programs was the key to Colombia's fertility decline. Colombians have had a
strong disposition to receive and use contraceptive methods for many years,
their  demand for children was low even before modern economic develop-
ment and family planning services were present in their  country. Also, the
high levels of rural-urban  migration and health and educational improve-
ments reinforced the declining trend in demand for children. On rhe other
hand, mortality decline, which could have increased the supply of children,
was offset by changes in the marriage patterns  of Colombian women, which
ensured a continuing motivation to control fertility.
The motivation to control fertility was met efficiently by a growing
family planning system, administered by an NGO called Profamilia and the
government. Financed by fimds collected internationally,  Profamilia devel-
oped a strong structure  since the late 1960s,including clinics, community
distribution  and social marketing programs. These programs supplied
almost 50% of family planning services, mostly in the form of pills and
sterilizations, for mostly nominal fees.
Colombia's fertility rates  are still over replacement levels; by 1990 the
total fertility rate was estimated at 3.1 children per woman. It is reasonable
to expect that  this value will continue to decrease as more women use
contraceptives and as the younger generations of women who participate in
the l&>  ,or  market  and adopt modern contraceptive techniques reach child-
bearing years. In short, the story of Colombia's fertility decline is an exam-
ple of success in both guaranteeing  the basic right of any household to
decide when and how many children they will have and improving the
economic  perspectives of a developing country.I.-  A Framework  for Analvzingt Fertility  Change
The analysis of fertility change and its effects can be traced to the late
18'  and e,ly  19'  centuries, when Malthus published his theory relating
economic  well being and population growth. He believed that  unchecked
population growth would generate vice and misery, which in time would
reduce the population size. The economic development of Europe and North
America during the following  decades obscured the role of the population
issue, but after 1945, when accelerating population growth was observed in
developing countries, social scientists and economists renewed their interest
in population trends.
The DemograpFC TzansitAion  theory, first proposed by FEnk  Notestein
in the 1930s, was developed during the post-World War II period. This
approach to the analysis oI fertility and mortality decline is based on the
concept of modernization. In a first stage, population is mostly rural,  P  ica-
tional levels, income and consumption are low, markets are not well deval-
oped and mortality and fertility are high. But at some point, for reasons
beyond the scope of the theory, societies "modernize." Cities begin to grow,
levels of education and income increase, industrial  technologies are adopted,
and mortality and fertility decline. Thus, the determinant  factor in the
demographic transition  from a high to a low fertility and mortality state is
moderDization.
This rough deterministic model was improved with the "Intermediate
Variables," introduced by Davis and Blake (1956). They identified a set of
eleven intermediate  variables organized in three groups. Any effect the
social or economic  factors would have on fertility should operate through
these variables. They are:
I.- Factors affecting exposure to intercourse:
A.- Those governing the formation and dissolution of unions in the
reproductive period:
1.- Age of entry into sexual unions,
2.- Permanent  celibacy: proportion of women never entering sexual
unions, and
3.- Amount of reproductive period spent after or between divorces.
B.- Those governing the exposure to intercourse within unions:
4.- Voluntary abstinence,
5.- Involuntary abstinence, and
6.- Coital frequency.
-2-II.- Factors affecting exposure to conception:
7.- Fecundity or infecundity, as affected by involuntary causes,
8.- Use of contraception, and
9.- Fecundity or infecundity, as affected by voluntary  causes.
III.- Factors affecting gestation and successful parturition:
10.- Fetal mortality from involuntary causes (spontaneous abortion),
and
11.- Fetal mortality from voluntary causes (iiLduced  abortion).
While these intermediate  variables cover every possible factor affecting
fertility, they proved to be ineffective when analyzing empirical data, due to
the difficulties involved in measuring them. Bongaarts and Potter
(Bongaarts, 1978 and Bongaarts and Potter, 1983) reformulated them, using
a set of seven "Proximate Determinants," today widely used as the basis for
analyzing changes in fertility. They defined the Proximate Determinants  for
Natural  Fertility  and those for Regulated Fertility  separately.
Natural  fertility, dofined as the number of children a woman would have
in her life if no deliberated attempt to limit it is present, may be affected
through five proximate determinants:
- The proportion of women married, when there are no marriage delays
for family planning purposes,
- the duration  of postpartum infecundability (linked with the duration
of lactation),
- the natural  fecundability, determined by biological factors and fre-
quency of intercourse,
- the  risk  of intrauterine  mortality,  and
- the  onset  of permanent  sterility.
Bongaarts (1978) estimated  that if marriage is early and univer-
sal, periods of breastfeeding are reduced to a minimum, and no extraordi-
nary levels of infecundability, intrauterine  mortality, or sterility are pres-
ent, the total fertility rate can reach 15 births per woman. Among observed
populations, the highest levels of natural  fertility is slightly lower than 10
births per woman.
The second set of proximate determinants  defined by Bongaarts
and Potter are the determinants  of regulated fertility. These also include
the age at marriage, when it is deliberately manipulated  to affect the
number of births,  and the use of contraception and the prevalence of in-
duced abortion. While these determinants  have not had large effects in
traditional  societies, they have been the basis for fertility decline.
-3 -A-. The Easterlin  Model
While the proximate determinants  approach -an be used for
empirical analysis, it is not completely compatible with many of the theoret-
ical models used to explain fertility decline. These theoretical models, based
on the economic concepts of demand and supply of children, could not use
the proximate determinants  easily, since some of the determinants  contain
both demand and supply elements.
Richard Easterlin developed a framework adapting the proximate
determinants  idea to a demand-supply scheme (Easterlin, 1978 and
Easterlin  and Crimmins, 1985). His framework had the advantage of
presenting an economic  approach to the analysis of fertility while keeping
enough flexibility to be used as an organizing system. This framework
organizes the proximate determinants  into three categories: demand for
children, supply of children and regulation costs (Figure I).
On the demand side, social s'nd individual conditions are thought
to determine the demand for children Shrough modifying parents'  tastes,
affecting their ability to support children and determining the levels of
economic and non-economic  costs and benefits. Economic costs and benefits
include expenditures  such as schooling and revenues such as income gener-
ated by children's labor. Examples of non-economic  costs and benefits
include leisure time lost to take care of children's needs and the psychologi-
cal rewards of parenthood.
Supply of children is defined as the number of surviving children a
woman would have if there is no deliberate effort to reduce fertility. This
concept includes natural  fertility, with its proxinate  determinants,  and
child mortality. Finally, Easterlin introduced regulation costs into the
model. These are the costs involved in limiting fertility through  contracep-
tion or induced abortion. There are two possible types of costs, the psychic
costs and the market costs. Psychic costs include the emotional distress a
person may suffer when obtaining or using a regulation method. This
involves societal disapproval, religious belief or personal myths. Market
costs include monetary costs of obtaining regulation methods.
Within this &famework,  when demand for children is larger than
supply, no regulation is needed and the number of surviving children per
women is identical to the supply of children. During the modernization
proc-  s, infant  mortality declines and the duration of breastfeeding is
redued,  increasing the supply of children.
-4-Figure I. Easterlin's Framework for Analysis of Fertility Change.
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Meanwhile, demad  for cbildren declines due to te  lower bene-
fits and larger costs of children in modern socetiedes  and, eventually, supply
becomes larger than demand (point A in figure II). Final Famifly  Size will
still  be determined  by the increasing level of supply of  children  for some
time, due to the high costs of regulation. EventuaUy, excess supply is large
enough and regulation costs have faUen to a level in which regulation
methods begin to be used (point B in pgure  sI).  Regulation  osts  ceontinue  to
fall, with psychic costs disappearing  and market  -osts  becoming lower, until
the number of surviving c-hildren  per woman becomes almost identical to
the demand of children (point C in figulre  II).
B.- Demand  for Children
Among the three elements intrinsic to Easterlin!s firamework,  the
demand for children is the one which has attracted  the most interest  and
research. The supply of children and the cost of regulation are critical
aspects on the fertility determination process in traditional  societies, butFigure II. Modernization and Fertility Change.
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their  roles seem to be secondary at the onset of fertility decline. The supply
of children by itself has a relatively low impact on fertility, especially during
a modernization process.  The regulation costs have a strong effect once
demand has dropped enough to generate  an excess supply of children.
Demand for children can vary within a wide range and is the driving force
behind fertility decline.
Why do people want children? The answer is critical for the work
of planners  and scholars. Gary Becker (1960)  introduced the first approach
to the economics of population through a simple model where children are
treated  as a normal good, the demand for them increasing with income.
Since then, many scholars have contributed to a large debate. While neo-
classical economists have attempted to explain fertility through microeco-
nomic models, using theories such as the quantity-quality  approach (Becker,
1981) or the value of time (Mincer, 1963), others have argued that  although
each birth is a unique and individual act, fertility is a social behavior and,
therefore, sociological  and anthropological approaches should be used to
explain it (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988, Caldwell, 1982).
One conclusion we can obtain from this debate is that  if demand
for children is analyzed with the same criteria  as the demand for other
goods, a number of special assumptions and considerations must be drawn.
-6-Empirical studies have not shown a direct positive correlation between
income and fertility. People do not "buy"  more children when they are
richer, at least not as a rule. Regardless of the conceptual theory used, there
is some agreement that  in very low income societies the association between
income and fertility tends to be positive and that  this reflects a "rational"
behavior for individual decision makers who probably perceive children as
an medium term investment. Mead Cain (1977) estimated that  in Bangla-
desh boys begin working in income-producing activities at a very young age.
By age 12 they become net producers and, by age 15, they have produced as
much as they have consumed during their lives.
Whether it is based in Becker's quantity-quality  scheme or in
Caldwell's wealth flow, it is clear that high fertility is not economically
rational in a high income, developed society. In Becker's approach, increases
in income generate larger demand for children, but also increase the desired
"quality" of those children. Since the quality factor interacts with the price
of children, increases in income generate more than proportional increases
in children's cost. This discourages parents  from "consuming"  children, thus
reducing fertility. In strictly economic  terms, the substitution  effect is larger
than  the income effect and the final number of children demanded is lower.
For Caldwell, the wealth flow, which goes from younger to older generations
in traditional  societies, is reversed when, due to modernization, child labor
is reduced, old age security is supplied by the state, fanilial  work is less
common and education becomes compulsory and more expensive. In both
models, "rational" families will try to reduce their offspring and this lower
demand would generate what we called in Figure I "Motivation to Control
Fertility".
C.- Culture  of Control
Fertility decline can only happen if both excess supply of children
and relatively low-cost regulation methods are present. Reductions on
demand induce an excess supply of children and generate a motivation to
adopt regulatory methods. But the existence of such motivation does not
guarantee  that  contraception will be adopted. Several factors affect the level
of contraception use. A number of sociological  and anthropological variables,
such as the "culture" predominant in the community are very important.
Different societies going through similar socio-economic  circumstances do
not present  the same pattern  of fertility decline. The difference could be
explained by using the concept of ideational change (Cleland and Wilson,
1987). This concept (which can be considered part of the psychic costs in
Easterlin's  framework) is based on the idea that societies with different
cultural settings have different attitudes  toward birth  control.
-7-This approach has the advantage of including sociological  elements
in the analysis. The social and cultural differences between and within
societies become essential in the analysis. Analyzing World Fertility Survey
data, Cleland and Wilson mention that  ....durng  transition,  higher levels of
parents'  education are associated with greater use of birth  control and lower
marital  fertility.... (The relationship) tends to be stronger than for the more
pure economic characteristics of couples, such as income, husband's  occupa-
tion, or standard  of living...." (Cleland and Wilson, 1987:22). Of course, the
relationship between education and the "pure economic  characteristics" is
very strong, although the direction of the causality is not clear at all.
Using data from the European Value Studies and the European
Economic Community Eurobarometer, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988)
analyzed the cultural and ideational changes in Western Europe. They
believe that the two most important  ideational changes in post-World War
II Western Europe have been the processes of secularization and individua-
tion. They define secularization as the decreasing belief or adherence to
traditional  religion and individuation as the decreasing emphasis in institu-
tional regulations and increasing support of individual decisions. Although
their  principal contribution is theoretical, their empirical analysis indicates
a negative relationship between both secularization and individuation and
the desired or actual family size. These findings are good examples of the
possible sociological  and anthropological analyses mentioned above.
Unfortunately, it is highly uncommon to find data  of the European
Value Studies type for developing countries. Information on values and
beliefs is usually based on small scale anthropological studies. Thus, the
cultural and religious variables are extremely difficult to identify and
measure  and they are often overlooked.
-8  -Me- The  Background
A.- The Economic  Situation  in the  Countrv  over  the  last  25 Years
1.- Income
a.- Levels of Income and its Growth:
Colombia has one of the largest economies  in Latin America. Its
gross domestic production in 1989 was over 44 billion dollars at 1980 prices.
This makes the Colombian economy  the fifth largest in the region, behind
Brazil, Mexico,  Argentina and Venezuela. Its economic  growth in the last
twenty years has been the second fastest, behind Brazil.
The relatively positive situation of the Colombian economy during
the 1970s and 1980s can be attributed  partly to the high levels of coffee
prices and the industrialization  and export diversification policies applied by
the government. Colombia was a member of the International  Coffee Agree-
ment, an organization formed in 1962 to stabilize the international  market
of coffee  through  a quota system. The Agreement was terminated  in 1990.
Table I. GDP and GDP per capita. Colombia and Latin America.
Colombia  Latin America
Year  GDP  GDP per Capita  GDP  GDP per Capita
Million  Annual  Dollars  Annual  Million  Annual  Dollars  Annual
Dollars  growth  growth  Dollars  growth  Growth
1970  19149  5.6%  897  3.1%  402296  5.4%  1499  2.9%
1975  25162  5.2%  1049  2.8%  527996  5.4%  1732  3.0%
1980  32479  2.5%  1207  0.4%  690989  0.6%  2013  1.6%
1985  36821  4.8%  1232  2.9%  712532  2.3%  1855  0.2%
1989  44611  1379  783404  1872
Sources.  GDP,  ECLA  (1989)  Table 114,  World  Bank (1991)
Population:  WiDkie  and Ochoa  (1989)  Table  605.
Thanks to the good performance of its external  sector, Colombia
has been able to control the growth of its external debt. By the end of 1989
the total external  debt was around 16.2 billion dollars. Colombia has had,
together with Chile, she highest standing in terms of reliability to foreign
creditors during the 1980's crisis. Its extemal debt was negotiated in the
secondary market  at 58% of its nominal value at the end of 1989, a high
rate if compared with the 40% of Brazil and Venezuela or the 20% of
-9-Argentina. This situation encouraged a continuous flow of foreign invest-
ment which amounted to 3.7 billions of dollars for the period 1980-1987.
The goal of diversifying the economy  was partially  accomplished
during the last 20 years. Table II presents the percent participation of
agriculture  in GDP and exports over time. Agricultural production de-
creased in importance since 1970, from 25.1% of the GDP, to 17.2% in 1987.
Likewise, agricultural  goods were more than  75% of all exports in 1970, and
dropped to about 41% in 1989. The data about GDP reflects the increasing
importance of manufacturing  and services in the national  economy.  The
large variation in the participation of agriculture  on exports can be rellted
to an increasing role of manufacturing  and, especially, the boom of oil and
coal exports in the eighties. Also, variations in international  prices produced
large changes in the value of coffee exports, modifying the overall impor-
tance of agricultural  exports.
Table II. Participation  of Agriculture in the Economy.
Year  % of Agriculture  % of Agriculture  % of Labor Force
in GDP  in Exports  in Agriculture
1960  34.0%  75.0%  50.2%
1965  30.0%  71.8%  45.0%
1970  25.1%  76.1%  39.3%
1975  23.9%  59.1%  36.7%
1980  19.4%  69.0%  34.2%
1985  17.0%  65.0%  28.1%l
1987  17.2%  44.7%  26.0%
1989  17.9%  40.8%  NA
Note:'  Estimate
Sources:  ECLA  (1989),  World  Bank  (1987,1991),  DANE  (1984)
and Economic  Inteipgence  Unit (1989)
The sustained economic  growth of the last 25 years has been a
major factor in the Colombian modernization process. As we will see later,
deep social changes occurred during this period. Rapid urbanization  and
declines in mortality  and fertility have been the demographic aspects of
those social changes. While claiming that  the economic  growth has been the
unique cause for these processes would be an overstatement, it is unlikely
-10  -that  the social changes would have occurred so fast without a relatively
successful economy.
b.- Major Economic Upheavals:
Colombia is the second largest producer of coffee in the world. Its
economy  is highly dependent on the performance of coffee exports. Coffee
prices have varied tremendously due to weather conditions in Brazil, the
largest  coffee producer in the world. This external factor has had a negative
effect on the Colombian economy.
Nevertheless, two major developments in the last 10 years have
produced important  changes in the Colombian economy.  The large-scale
exploitations of coal in the North Cerrej6n area, begun in 1985, and petro-
leum in the eastern  plains, begun in 1986, caused a dramatic increase in
the size of the mining sector. In 1980, mining represented  1.1% of the GDP
and the trade in mining products had a deficit of more than  600 million
dollars, almost exactly the commercial deficit. In 1987, mining was 7.9% of
the GDP and exports exceeded imports by almost 2 billion dollars, two and
a half times the trade  surplus of that year. These developments provided an
important  source of capital in a period when obtaining international  credit
was extremely difficult.
c.- The Role of Agriculture:
Agriculture has always had a major role in Colombian economy.
Although the diversification process mentioned above, together with the
expansion of mining and oil production, has decreased its importance, by
1989 it still represented  18% of the GDP and slightly more than  a fourth of
the economically active population was occupied in agriculture.
Coffee is the main agricultural  product, but there are other crops,
mostly used for direct internal  consumption or as industrial  inputs.  Rice,
maize, and sorghum among the cereals; cotton and soya among the oilseeds;
and potatoes, yucca, and cane sugar among other industrial  crops, are the
largest. Meat production, mostly beef and pork, is directed to internal
consumption.
The changes in agriculture had an important  role in the social and
demographic changes of the society. More intensive exploitation techniques
and a decline in the participation of agricultural  goods in the GDP and
exports accelerated the massive migrations to urban areas. This process, as
we will see later,  was also characterized by lowering real income for rural
workers, resulting in a decline of the percentage of labor force in agriculture
from 50% to 26% in less than  30 years.
- 11  -d.- The Informal Sector:
When economists use the concept of "informal sector", they are
describing an area  of the economy  not fully associated with the capitalistic
production techniques. Nevertheless, the concept is used for several differ-
ent aspects of the economy, leading to a certain amount of confusion. The
concept was developed as an effort to characterize a recurring phenomena in
developing countries, associated with a dualistic economy. This phenomena
includes the presence of noncapitalistic subsistence activities in a capitalis-
tic environment, such as small businesses with no or minimum capital,
unskilled self-employed workers and young women working as household
employees. Other characteristics  of the informal sector are a widespread tax
avoidance among both capitalistic and non-capitalistic companies and a
large proportion of the labor force receiving income below a subsistence
level. Finally, this concept can include illegal activities, which in the
Colombian case is especially important.
In any case, the concept of an informal sector is extremely difficult
to handle and, by definition, almost impossible to measure. Attempts to
assess its importance are usually based in household surveys and censuses.
Since these secondary data sources are not designed to detect informality,
only approximations can be made, usually based on the size of the firms or
the prevalence of self-employment. Based on the National Household Survey
of 1984, the National Employment Service estimated that  53% of the labor
force of the four largest cities (Bogotd, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla)  is in
the informal sector (SENALDE, 1986). In their  calculation, they assumed
that the informal sector consists of:
- al  unremunerated  family members,
- all household employees,
- all self-employed, except professionals,
- employees of the private sector in firms with less than  10 work-
ers, and
- employers in firms with less than  10 workers.
While this definition seems rather  arbitrary,  it presents  a disag-
gregation of this informal sector, from which it is possible to obtain some
empirical information. The largest groups among the informal labor force
are the self-employed and the employees in firms with less than 10 workers
(Table III). When assessing the levels of informality by sector of economic
activity, SENALDE found the largest concentrations of informal labor force
are in agriculture, construction and services. The large proportion of the
labor force in the informal sector is a major obstacle to the implementation
of efficient public policies. If 50% of the labor force is not "legal," their  situa-
tion will not be affected by changes in labor legislation. Their income levels
- 12 -and  working  conditions  are  defined  in  a market  where  they  have  no
bargaining  power. Unions  cannot  protect  them,  and  health  services  or social
security  cannot  be provided  through  the  traditional  channels.
Table III. Labor Force, Formal, Informal and Total, by Category of Employment.
GROUP  Formal  Informal  Total  % Informal
Unremunerated  0.0  5.3  2.8  100.0
Family  Members
Private Employees  71.8  34.0  58.8  34.6
Public Employees  21.9  0.0  10.4  0.0
Household Employees  0.0  10.5  5.5  100.0
Self Employed  4.7  43.1  25.0  91.0
Employed  1.6  7.1  4.4  83.3
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  52.8
Souroe:  SENALDE  (1988).
Another  dimension  of informality  is related  to the  legal  status  of
the activity. While in most countries illegal economic activities are relatively
small, the case of Colombia is different. The production and distribution  of
cocaine has  become one of the most successful businesses in Colombia.
About 25,000 hectares are planted with coca in Southeast Colombia, not a
very large area compared with the 50,000 hectares in Bolivia or the 100,000
hectares in Peru, and a very small area compared with the almost 1 million
hectares planted with coffee.  While coca crops are small, the processing and
production of cocaine has become a major productive activity in Colombia.
While data  is logically imprecise, it has been estimated  that about 200 tons
of cocaine are produced and exported every year. The retail value of Colom-
bian cocaine was estimated, for 1987, at $22 billion. Of this amount, be-
tween $1.5 and $2 billion were estimated  to have returned  to Colombia (The
Economist, 1988a and 1988b).
This amount is small compared with a GDP of $41 billion, but it
represents  almost 30% of total legal exports, about the same value as coffee
exports. These amounts have changed since the beginning of the "war on
drugs," launched by the U.S. government. Although this initiative has
depressed coca leaf and coca paste prices, its effect on cocaine prices and
production is not clear and it could have increased Colombia's revenues
from cocaine.
- 13 -The magnitude of the informal sector is very important  when
analyzing demographic behaviors. In Colombia, as in most Latin American
countries, mortality and fertility differentials by socio-economic  status  are
large. At this point there are no available data to estimate total fertility
rates  or mortality rates for families whose main source of income comes
from the informal sector. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that  most
informal workers are low income, low educated individuals. The "Encuesta
de Prevalencia, Demograffa y Salud 1986" (CCRP, 1988), estimated  that
non-educated women had a total fertility rate two or three times larger  than
that  of the more highly educated. We will consider these differentials more
carefully later, but it appears that the groups which ought to be the target
of most social policies are those most immersed in informality and, conse-
quently, the most difficult to reach.
2.- Income Distribution
Data on income distribution  has been collected and published in
Colombia since the early 1960s. Personal income distribution worsened
during the late sixties and did not change during the early seventies but
slowly improved in the late seventies and early eighties. Considering that
total income per capita increased substantially  during that  period, whether
or not the good overall performance of the economy  improved the standard
of life of the poorest is an open question.
The first household survey including income and expenditure data
was completed between 1967 and 1968 by CEDE/ECIEL in Bogotd,
Medellfn, Cali and Barranquilla.  In 1970 DANE began its program of
households surveys, including the cities mentioned above and Bucaramanga,
Manizales and Pasto. Since 1976, the sampling and methodology of the
surveys have been the same, allowing fill  comparability.
Gini's coefficient, an index of the level of inequality,  shows a
changing pattern  during the period. Theoretically it may vary between 1, if
all income goes to one individual, and 0, if the distribution  is perfectly
egalitarian.  In Colombia, it had a value of 0.47 in the 1967-68 survey. As
mentioned above, a regressive redistribution  took place in those years,
bringing the Gini's coefficient to 0.52 in 1970, although problems in compa-
rability should be considered when assessing this change. Income distribu-
tion improved during the seventies, with the Gini coefficient going from a
high 0.52 in 1970 to 0.43 in 1983. However, the coefficient declined to 0.45
in 1985.
Analyzing the 1976-1985 period, Reyes (1985) concluded that the
main factor explaining the overall improvement in income distribution  was
- 14 -the change in educational level. The variation in income differentials by
educational level accounts for 53% of the improvement of the distribution.
Other factors, such as age structure and sex composition of the labor force
explain about 20% of the total change in inequality.
Table IV. Distribution of Urban Income. 1967-1985
DECILE  GINI COEF-
1 to 5  6 to 8  9  10  FICIENT
1967/6812  19.3  26.3  16.0  38.4  0.47
19702  16.2  25.0  14.8  44.0  0.52
1976  16.9  25.5  15.5  42.1  0.51
1978  19.0  25.8  15.2  40.0  0.48
1980  21.2  26.5  15.2  37.1  0.45
1983  21.6  27.4  15.8  35.3  0.43
1985  21.8  26.5  15.3  36.4  0.45
Notes:  " Data for 1967-68  are from the four largest cities.
I  The methodology  for the 1967-78  and 1970 surveys are different from those of
the rest of the surveys.  Thus, these data are not strictly comparable.
Sour-ces: Berry and Soligo  (1980)  and Reyes (1988).
Overall, considering the changes of income distribution  and the
economy  as a whole, the 1976-1985 period can be divided into three inter-
vals: between 1976 and 1980, when the economy  grew rapidly, with highi
employment and increasing wages, the distribution became more egalitari-
an. From 1980 to 1983 a moderate recession, which slowed the increase in
wages and produced some unemployment, was accompanied by a slower but
continuous improvement in the distribution, while the interval 1983-1985,
when the GDP recovered while employment and real wages were depressed,
was one of regression in the income distribution. In other words, no direct
causality or even correlation between income distribution  and economic
growth can be established for Colombia in the last 15 years. Income distri-
bution, strongly associated with real wages, was not affected by the level
and pace of economic  growth, but by the characteristics  of the prevalent
style of development.
Colombian income distribution  has some characteristics  in com-
mon with most Latin American countries. Latin America has the worst
- 15 -income distribution  among developed and developing regions. As we see in
Table V, the income ratio of the highest 20% to the lowest 40% income
groups is at least twice larger in Latin America countries than in any other
region.
Table V. Income Distribution in Selected Countries
Country  Decile  - Upper  20%
(year)  0  to2  3to4  5to6  7to8  9  10  Lower40%
Japan  8.7  13.2  17.  23.1  15.1  22.4  1.71
(1979) 
Bangladesh  9.3  13.1  16.8  21.8  14.1  24.9  1.74
(1981-82)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
S(1W9ed  8.0  13.2  17.4  24.5  16.1  20.8  1.74
(nd8a3)  8.1  12.3  16.3  22.0  14.7  26.7  2.03
Guatemala  5.5  8.0  13.1  21.3  16.4  36.3  3.90
Colombia  4.0  8.7  13.5  20.8  15.9  37.1  4.17
(1988)  _  _  _  __  _  _
Venezuela  4.7  9.2  14.0  21.5  16.4  34.2  6.34
(1987)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Costa Rica  3.3  8.3  13.2  20.7  15.7  38.8  6.69
(1986)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _
(r198)  2.4  5.7  10.7  18.6  12.4  46.2  7.23
Source: World Bank (1990)
Among Latin American countries, Colombia ranks  fairly well,
especially if compared with higher GDP countries such as Venezuela or
Brazil.
3.- EmDloyment
a.- Levels of Employment:
As a result of the high fertility prevalent until  a few years ago,
Colombia has a rapidly growing labor force. This phenomena, together with
the increased participation of women in the labor force, has put a strain  on
the labor market.  While adult males are the majority of the labor force, its
- 16 -composition has been changing since the early sixties. In 1964 there were
398 males per hundred females in the labor force. This ratio declined to 282
by 1973 and 241 by 1978, showing the rapid process of incorporation of
women into the labor force. This process is faster among the younger
cohorts. Among those 15 to 29 years old, the sex ratio declined from 308 in
1964 to 159 in 1978. Finally, as it should be expected, the presence of
women in the labor force is particularly  important  in the largest city,
Bogotd, where the sex ratio in 1984 for the whole Economically Active
Population (EAP) was 140 and for the 15-29 years old group was only 113.
Table VI. Sex Ratios for the Economically  Active Population. Total EAP and
EAP aged 15-29. Colombia and Bogota
Total Country  Bogota
Year  Total  EAP  Total  EAP
EAP  15-29 years  EM'  15-29 years
1964  398  308  __
1973  282  209  164  126
1978  241  159  146  113
1984  l  l_l  140  113
Source: SENALDE  (1986)
The participation of women in the economically  active population
is certainly larger than surveys and censuses estimate. Even if household
chores are not considered jobs, there are many women working for non-
household members. They cook, clean or take care of children without
formal schedules or regular  monetary wages, but in exchange for other
services or goods. These women do not consider themselves as employed and
they are shown as inactive in official statistics.
Several attempts  have been made to measure the magnitude of this phe-
nomena in Latin America, using special modules in surveys and experimen-
tal censuses. The resulting data have shown that  real female rates  of
participation  are about 100% larger than those officially  measured, indicat-
ing the need to reformulate the approach to this issue.
b.- Unemployment:
Urban unemployment has been regularly  measured since 1970 in
the largest  four cities and its estimation is an important  part of the quarter-
ly household survey carried by DANE. The rates  of urban unemployment
-17-have been around 10% to 13% since the early 1970s, with a peak of 14.7%
in June  1986 and a low of 7.0% in December 1981. At all times, the more
dynamic economy  of Bogota managed to keep the rate about 2 points under
the average of the four largest cities.
Including national data from surveys in the early 1970s, unem-
ployment rates have shown a cyclical behavior, with their  best periods in
the late 1970s and early 1980s and a declining tendency since mid 1986.
Whether this trend will continue depends on the overall performance of the
economy. Nevertheless, considering the large size of the cohorts that will
enter the labor force in the near future, it is unlikely that unemployment
rates  will descend and stay low. Only a continuous and rapid growth of the
economy will generate  enough demand for labor to avoid unemployment in a
context of rapidly increasing labor force, as is the case of Colombia.
Figure III. Unemployment Rates. 1970-1988.
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- 18 -c.- Trends in Wages:
Real wages have been characterized by their  stability over time.
While industrial  wages have steadily increased since 1975, agricultural
wages have been depressed with almost no change over a 12 years period.
Table VII. Average Wages in Industry  and Agriculture. Base: 1980=100
Year  Industry  Agriculture 1
I__________  Manual  Non-Manual
1975  86.4  99.4
1976  88.5  99.1  84.4
1977  83.5  93.2  98.6
1978  93.1  97.0  105.1
1979  99.2  98.6  98.0
1980  100.0  100.0  100.0
1981  101.4  102.5  97.5
1982  104.8  105.4  95.0
1983  110.3  110.1  97.1
1984  118.1  115.6  96.6
1985  114.6  113.7  94.6
1986  120.1  116.4  99.8
1987  119.2  116.5  98.8
1988  . 117.7  116.8  102.1
Note: Wages  in crop fauming  in lowlands  without  food.
Sources:  Dane  (1986)  and  ECLA  (1989a)
No clear relationship between industrial  real wages and urban
unemployment rates  can be found in the data. While, as mentioned above,
unemployment rates  have had a cyclical  trend, industrial  real wages do not
show any significant decline over the period. Nevertheless, after a period of
fast growth between 1977 and 1984, real wages have stabilized or slightly
decreased.
- 19-Agricultural wages have had a different pattern.  They are directly
affected by the performance of agricultural  production. In Colombia, this
means that coffee prices have a major effect on agricultural  real wages. The
maximum level of agricultural  real wages since 1976 was in 1978, the year
after coffee  prices reached their historic highest level. Following the same
pattern,  the lowest real wages since 1976 were paid in 1985, after five years
of depressed coffee  prices.
This long term depression in rural  wages, together with the
decline in importance of agriculture mentioned before and the improving
conditions of life for urban dwellers, facilitated a rapid transformation  of the
urban-rural  structure  of Colombia. Rural-urban  migration became one of the
most significative processes in the last decades, encouraging changes in
behavior by the former rural  residents, adopting urban patterns  in regard to
fertility and family formation.
d.- Poverty:
Poverty is still a serious problem in Colombia. Measuring poverty
levels is generally difficult, since the concept itself is subjective. Also, the
poor are the sector of society most difficult to survey and study, making the
problem more elusive. Colombia has officially  adopted the concept of "Nece-
sidades i3dsicas Insatisfechas" (NBI), an index used in most Latin American
countries measuring the number of basic needs not met. Five indicators are
used to assess poverty- a) adequacy of housing, b) occupation density,
c) access to public utilities (such as electricity, potable water, or sewerage),
d) economic dependency ratio, and e) number of school age children not
attending  school. Based on these criteria, a household is in absolute poverty
if one of the five indicators is not satisfactory, and in misery if two or more
indicators are deficient.
The NBI index has been criticized for its strong bias towards
housing-related indicators, but no other comprehensive index could be built
with data available currently, while it is possible to estimate  NBI for most
censuses and population surveys. Based on the 1985 census, it appears that.
38.1% of households (or 43% of population) are living in absolute poverty,
and 17.6% of households (or 21.4% of population) are in a state  of misery.
Poverty appears to be concentrated in the northem  areas of the
country, specifically  in the Atlantic region (see map in figure XX).  Clearly,
poverty is lower in departments  with larger urban populations or stronger
economic  resources (such as the areas where coffee  is produced). There is a
striking correlation between levels of poverty and demographic indicators,
fertility and mortality rates. Thus, it is in the Atlantic region where fertility
and mortality were the highest in 1986. On the other hand, in Bogota,
where only 4.5% of households were in a state  of misery in 1985, the total
-20 -fertility rate was below 3 children per woman and mortality was the lowest
in the country.
The causal relation between poverty and delays in demographic
transition  is strong,  showing  that  economic and  social development  for all
social sectors is a precondition for demographic transition.
B.- Population  Levels.  Trends and Distribution
1.- Size. Growth and Distribution
Colombia's population has gone through major transformations
during the second half of the 20t  century. The total population in 1985 was
27.8 million, almost 150% larger than that  of 1951. The rate of growth
reached a peak between 1951 and 1964, when the total population grew at
3.2% annually. After that,  a rapid drop in fertility induced a decline in the
annual  growth rate to a level of 1.7% between 1973 and 1985.
Table VIII. Population and Growth Rates. Census Data and World Bank
Projections, 1951-2025.
Year  Population  Annual Growth  Percent Urban
1951  11548000  3.2%  38.7%
1964  17485000  3.0%  52.0%
1973  22862000  1.7%  59.3%
1985  27867000  2.0%  67.2%
2000  36478000  1.0%  75.2%
2025  4777200  83.9%
Sources:  CCRP  (1988), UN  (1986)  and Bulatao et al (1989)
The growth was accompanied by fast urbanization and large
internal  migrations. While less than 39% of the population lived in cities
(defined as conglomerations of 1500 or more inhabitants)  in 1951, 67.2% did
so in 1985. Between 1951 and 1985, the urban population grew at 4.2% per
year, while rural population grew at 0.7% per year. Moreover, rural  popula-
tion declined between 1973 and 1985 by about 25,000 people.
Projections from the World Bank (Bulatao et al, 1989) estimate
the growth rate  at 0.85% in 2025. The population will reach 47.5 million by
-21  -2025, continuing the deceleration until the total population stabilizes at 57
million by the year 2100.
In a territory of more than 1.1 million square kilometers, 98% of
the population lives in less than 50% of the country. The southeast area  of
the country, bordering Brazil and Peru, is almost uninhabited.  This region,
known as the Natiunal Territories, has  570,000 square kilometers and
550,000 inhabitants,  a density of less than one person per square  kilometer.
Colombia is divided in 23 Departments, 1 Special District and the
National Territories. For analytical and policy purposes, the country is
usually divided into five regions and the National Territories. The Atlantic
region comprises six departments:  Atlantico, Bolivar, Sucre, Cordoba,
Magdalena, Cesar and Guajira. About 20% of the population lives here, in
almost 10% of the national territory.  Its population is mostly urban,  with
two major urban centers located in the region.
The Pacific region includes four departments:  Valle del Cauca,
Cauca, Narifio and Choc6.  Almost 18% of the population lives in this region,
in an area equivalent to 12% of the territory. This is the least  developed
region, where the highest poverty levels and the lowest urbanization rates
have been observed.
The Central region is the largest in population, with 27% of the
Colombians living there. Its area is nearly 10% of the country, including six
departments:  Antioquia, Caldas, Quindio, Risaralda, Tolima and Huila.
While this is the area where most coffee  is cultivated, Colombian industrial
development began in its cities. Because of these two factors, this  area is
relatively affluent and its standard  of living is high. The Eastern  region is
the largest in area, with 16% of the national territory and 19% of the
population. Five departments  are included in this region: Santander  del
Sur, Santander  del Norte, Cundinamarca, Boyaca and Meta. Most oil and
mineral production is located in this area. Due to its proximity to BogotA,  it
has large rates  of emigration. Finally, the capital, BogotA,  is a region by
itself. It is the administrative,  political, commercial and industrial  center of
the country, with more than 14% of the population in one thousandth  of the
territory.
The regions are not only economically  and geographically different,
but historic and cultural differences explain broad variations in their
demographic characteristics.  A large ptart of the population of the Atlantic
region is of African origin, and families have what is known as a Caribbean
pattern  characterized by high marital  instability and a large proportion of
consensual marriages. Women have a major role in the family structure  and
the social life.
- 22 -Figure IV. Colombia and its Regions.
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The Central  region is where most traditional  values are main-
tained.  Most population is of Spanish  origin. Women have a minor role
outside the family, Catholicism is widespread and most unions are legal,
- 23 -Table IX. Population Distribution and Regional Growth Rates 1951-1985.
I  Region  National
Year  Atlantic  Pacific  Central  IEastem  Bogota  Territo-  Total
Distribution  |
1951  16.7%  19.3%  31.6%  25.2%  6.2%  1.0%  10.CGs
1964  18.6%  18.5%  29.7%  22.2%  9.7%  1.3%  100.0%
1973  20.1%  18.6%  27.2%  19.9%  12.5%  1.7%  100.0%
1985  20.4%  17.6%  26.7%  19.1%  14.3%  1.9%  100.0%
Density (Hab/km2)
1951  17.3  17.0  30.2  15.81  451.2  1  0.2 [  10.1
1964  29.2  24.6  42.9  21.1  1068.7  0.4  15.3
1973  41.2  32.4  51.4  24.8  1800.7  0.7  20.0
1985  51.0  37.4  61.5 j  29.0  2511.0  0.9  24.4
i____  Population  Growth  (Annual  Rates)
1951-64  4.0%  2.8%  2.7%  2.2%  6.7%  5.4%  3.2%
1964-73  3.9%  3.0%  2.0%  1.8%  5.8%  4.9%  3.0%
1973-85  1.7%  1.2% j  1.5%  1.3%  1.3%j  3.1%  1.7%
Source:  CCRP  (1988).
with families characterized by their stability and extension. The Eastern
region's population is, ethnically, the result of the mixing between Spanish
immigrants  and native Americans. The resulting culture generates families
where almost all of the power is on the m4le side, but women have a role in
economic activities. The Pacific region is the most ethnically and culturally
heterogeneous and characteristics of the three other regions can be found in
the area. Finally, in Bogota the population is the result  of large scale
migration from all over the country. Although different migrants  take their
cultural values with them, the most typical family structure  is the modern
nuclear family.
Although Colombia is formally a centralist republic, its geograph-
ical and  cultural  characteristics  have  produced  an unusually  decentralized
population for a Latin American country. The largest city, Bogotd, had only
14% of the total population in 1985. Six cities had more than  500,000
inhabitants,  and altogether they had 36% of the population, a very low
- 24  -number if compared with Argentina, where 35% of the population lived in
Buenos Aires, or Chile, where 40% lived in Santiago'.
The six largest cities are distributed among the five regions. In
addition, with the exception of BogotA,  none of them concentrates more than
35% of the region's population, indicating that  each region is also decentral-
ized.
Table X. Population of the Six Largest Cities and Proportion of the Popula-
tion of the Region.
city  Region  Population (thousands)  Percentage of Region
City  Region  -l 
1964  1973  1985  1964  1973  1985
Bogota  Bogota  1697  2845  3957  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% l
Medellin  Central  948  1476  1966  18.2%  23.7%  27.8%
Cali  Pacific  660  1002  1361  20.4%  23.6%  33.7%
Barranquilla  Atlantic  531  770  1108  16.4%  16.7%  19.7%
Bucaramanga  Eastern  225  388  519  5.8%  8.5%  10.2%
Cartagena  Atlantic  218  312  528  6.' %  6.8%  9.3%
Sources: DANE  (1985b)  and CCRP  (1988)
2.- Social Environment
a.- Education:
Educational levels have rapidly improved since the early 1960s.
Thirty five percent of the total adult population was illiterate in 1964. By
1985, the illiteracy rate  had been reduced to 12 percent. School attainment
increased during the 1960s, when the gross enrollment rate for primary
schooling increased from slightly less than  80 per hundred in 1960 to about
120 per hundred in 1971, that is, there were 120 students  per hundred
children aged 6 to 10. The rate declined slightly after a peak in 1972 but it
has been over 100 per hundred for the last twenty years, showing an almost
universal  school attainment  among children 6 to 10 years old.
Secondary schooling also increased at a fast pace during the
sixties and even faster during the seventies. Gross enrollment rates for
secondary schools went up from slightly over 10% in 1960 to about 50% in
Data estimated  at 1985.  Source:  Wilde and Ochoa  (1989)
- 25  -1985. This implies that  the ratio of students  in secondary school to students
in primary  school went up rapidly. In 1960 there were about 15 students  in
the  second level per hundred in the first. By 1985, the ratio  reached over
40.
The growth of tertiary  schooling enrollment was the fastest.  Only
2 people out of a hundred aged 20 to 24 were attending  a third level educa-
tional institution  in 1960. By 1985, 15% of those aged 20 to 24 were study-
ing, with one student in higher education for every four in secondary school.
The same ratio in 1960 was only one to seven.
Figure V. Gross Enrollment Ratios (GER) and Ratios Second Level
GER/First Level GER and Third Level GER/Second Level GER.
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Ses ratios among student  in primary  schools have been almost
perfectly even since the early sixties. In secondary schools there were 127
male students  per hundred female students  in 1964. This ratio  rapidly
dropped to about 96 males per hundred  females in 1973 and it has been
stable  since then. Finally, in the tertiary  level, in 1964 the number of males
per hundred  females were 323 in 1964. This figure declined to 165 in 1973
- 26 -and 103 in 1985, showing the rapid integration  of women into the educa-
tional system.( DANE, 1967, 1975 and 1986).
There is a striking simultaneity  between the increase in secondary
enrollment and the decline of fertility, suggesting that  the change in
educational attainment  was a major causal force behind the fertility transi-
tion in Colombia. The onset of fertility decline, around 1962, occurred when
gross primary enrollment was already over 75 and the upward trend in
secondary enrollment was accelerating. As Tan and Haines (1984) mention,
this correspondence is characteristic  of developing countries and is probably
a main factor in the explanation of demographic transition.
b.- Health:
Colombia's health  sector is divided into three major sub-sectors:
(1) public health; (2) social insurance  and (3) private. Data for 1985 show
that  52% of the population utilizes the public sector, 15% has social insur-
ance, 10% pays for services from the private sector and 23% has no health
services at all. There are about 950 hospitals in the country, with a total of
45,000 beds. The population per physician has dropped from 2600 in 1960 to
1000 in 1984. There are about 3000 health care centers and posts, but more
than  50% of them require remodeling and expansion (World Bank, 1985).
The social insurance  and private sectors are mostly concentrated
in large urban areas. Although the number of physicians seems to be fairly
large, their  distribution is unequal. About 70% of them practice in the
largest cities, where only 40% of the population resides. This inequity,
combined with inadequate  maintenance of medical facilities and an
inefficient bureaucratic  structure,means  that  23% of the Colombian popula-
tion, about 6.5 million people, have no medical services at all (World Bank,
1982).
The health  situation has improved in some aspects over the last
few years. In 1977, gastro-intestinal  and acute respiratory  infections
accounted for almost 40% of infant  deaths. By 1981, the proportion was
reduced to almost 30%, due mostly to a lower incidence of deaths caused by
gastro-intestinal  infections-related. Improvements in the environmental
health  situation, through provision of safe water and development of sewage
systems, were partially  responsible. The proportion of deaths of young
women attributed  to complications of maternity  was 7% in 1986, a relatively
high level. Nevertheless, the overall rate of mortality for this group was low,
85 per 100,000 thousand inhabitants.  Thus, the mortality rate for causes
related to maternity  was only 6 per 100,000, a ver low rate.
The effect of health  conditions on fertility is difficult to measure.
While in the Colombian case the effect of diseases on fecundability is
probably very low, there might be some relationship between the improve-
ment on infant  health and the parents' desired family size. In section IV.B
- 27 -we further  discuss the supply of children and the possible effects that  a de-
creasing infant mortality has on the total fertility rate.
c.- Religion:
About 95% of Colombians are Catholic; 92% of them regularly
attend to mass. Colombia had 19 Catholic priests per hundred thousand
inhabitants  in 1985, the largest number in Latin America, down from 28
per hundred thousand in 1960 (Wilkie and Ochoa, 1989). These numbers
indicate that  this is a society where the church's positions on social and
political issues  should affect individual behaviors.
Prior to the publication of the encyclical Humanae Vitae, in 1968,
the Latin American Catholic church had no position.  concerning fertility or
family planning. While family planning programs were promoted by the
U.S. government and international  agencies, the church had a contradictory
message. Large sectors of the Colombian church supported or, at least, did
not oppose family planning. Most of these priests  refuted the neomalthusian
ideas coming from the U.S., but supported family planning from a micro-
sociological  point of view. As Father Miguel Gonzalez, director of a Jesuit
center for social research  and activities, said, "... The neomalthusians state:
"The existence of a population explosion in our country justifies family
planning; and the State even has the right to impose birth control in the
nation...", ignoring the question of whether other kinds of reasons  justify  it
morally from the personal or family point of view...." (Stycos, 1971, p.81).
On the other side of the controversy, the church hierarchy actively
opposed any form of contraception, declaring that  "... Every contraceptive
method which tends directly to impede generation -pills, drugs, or mechani-
cal instruments- is illicit and those who use them commit mortal sin..."
(Stycos, 1971, p.85). The controversy was decided by the Pope when the
encyclical Humanae Vitae was published in 1968, in favor of the anti-family
planning groups.
Catholic doctrine has not changed since then, but Colombians,
95% of whom consider themselves to be practicing Catholics, have reduced
their  fertility by more than  40% by using contraceptive methods. This
apparent  contradiction seems to indicate that either the church has not
really tried  to enforce its doctrine or that its power to do so is much smaller
than it appears. This is an open issue and should be further  investigated.
d.- Women's Status  and Rights:
Family structure in Colombia varies widely from region to region.
The Atlantic region has the largest number of consensual marriages, but
almost 60% of the unions were not legally registered in 1986. At the other
extreme, about 75% of unions are legal in the Central region.
- 28 -On average,  women from the Atlantic region enter their  first
union when they are 19 years old and have their  first child one year later.
In other regions, women enter their  first union at 21 and have their  first
child at 22. This pattern  has  a direct effect on fertility rates. The total
fertility rate for the Atlantic region has been about 30% higher than  the
average for the country for the last 20 years. Whereas these characteristics
indicate  that  the family structure  is considerably weaker in the Atlantic
departments,  it is difficult to derive any conclusion about the status  of
women. Clearly, women in consensual unions have less economic support
from their  partners  than  those legally married.  However, weaker marital
relationships  give women a stronger position in their  relation with their
children and a more independent  status  in their  relationship  with the rest
of the society.
Figure VI. Percentage  of Women in Consensual Marriages Among Those
Currently  in Union by Region of Residence. Colombia 1978 and 1986.
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As of 1990, the Colombian legal system does not discriminate
against  women in any form. Women have complete economic and legal
independence from their  husbands,  most aspects of children's lives are
- 29-decided by both parents  and marriages can be dissolved by divorce. These
provisions are the result of reforms to Colombian family law during a period
of almost sixty years, between 1922 and 1982, when the last major reform
was done. In 1922, women were allowed to act as witnesses in legal process-
es. In 1954, voting right were granted. Family law has  slowly evolved
during this century, until in 1974 the government, by decree 2820/74,
eliminated all legal inequalities  originating gender differences. In 1976 a
new law authorized divorce. Finally, in 1982, children born out of wedlock
were granted  the same legal rights as legitimate children.
Contraception use seems to be, to some extent, controlled by
women. In 1986, 65% of married women were using some type of contracep-
tive method, and in 77% of the cases a female method. Among those not
using contraception and not wanting to have children, only 4.5% mentioned
their  husband's  opposition as the reason for this behavior.
In short, Colombian women have a relatively good status in the
society. They are not completely emancipated nor is their  relation with
males egalitarian,  but is clear that the society is not patriarchal  and that
women have a voice in decisions concerning family matters.
3.- Political Environment
a.- Form of Government:
Colombia is a Republic with a presidential  democratic system,
where authorities  are renewed every four years. After the overthrow of
Rojas Pinilla, a military dictator in the late 1950s, the country was man-
aged by two parties.  Liberals and Conservatives have governed under the
'Frente  Nacional", an agreement guaranteeing  alternate  presidencies and
collaboration of the opposition with the government. While the formal
agreement was abandoned in the 1970s, the democratic system has contin-
ued functioning.
b.- History:
Colombia was part of the viceroyalty of "Nueva Granada" under
Spanish domination. In 1810 a declaration of independence was signed and
after several years of war with Spain, the Great Colombia, including today's
territories  of Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama,  was created. By
1830 the Great Colombia was divided and Colombia began a slow process of
organization, which concluded after several civil wars and the secession of
Panama  in 1903. During the first half of tiis  century, the situation was
stable, but the political system collapsed in 1948, when a popular Liberal
leader, Jorge Gaitan, was killed. Violence erupted and the inability of the
conservative government to control it led to a military dictatorship.  In 1958
a new democratic president, Alberto Lleras Camargo, was elected and the
- 30 -Frente  Nacional pact began to function. The pact ended in 1974, and since
then most presidents have been Liberals.
Since the early 1960s several guerrilla groups have been active in
the country and the rapid development of h  drug economy with its share of
crime and violence have been threatening  the democratic system. While
some of the larger guerrilla groups have agreed to stop the war and partici-
pate in elections, the drug producers, associated in what is known as the
Medellin cartel, have been seriously limiting the economic, social and
political development of the country.
Colombia's economic  organization is structured  around a large
public sector. A large proportion of basic services, such as education and
health, are offered by the state. The government has control of the financial
system, offering low interest  loans for development projects. Also, several
programs pointed to poverty alleviation have been applied since the mid-
seventies, when the National Food and Nutrition  Program (PAN) began
distributing  food. More recently, a major program oriented to supplement
children's nutrition  has been "Hogares de Bienestar Infantil". In this pro-
gram, the Government provides food and offers home improvement loans to
participants.
Another typically public-supplied good is low-income  housing. The
traditional  policy had been oriented to developing highly subsidized low cost
housing. This has been modified recently. The new program calls for im-
proving the quality of current  housing, through legalization of land tenure,
infrastructure  development and participation of beneficiaries to undertake
self-help construction.
Colombia does not have regional conflicts. Although the country
is formed by several regions with important  topographic, economic,  cultural
and ethnic differences, there are not separatist  movements.
- 31 -IV.- The Demostraphic Situation
A.- Data  Sources
Sources of basic demographic data, such as aggregate birth  or
mortality rates, are abundant  and generally of high quality in Colombia for
recent years. Unfortunately, data on more detailed characteristics,  such as
child mortality or indicators of the proximate determinants,  have not besn
collected until the last few years and historical analyses are not possible.
There are three basic types of demographic data  sources: censuses, vital
registration  and surveys.
Colombia has a fairly long history of census taking. During this
century, nine censuses have been carried out. These censuses were taken in
1905, 1912, 1918, 1928, 1938, 1951, 1964, 1973 and 1985. Data necessary to
estimate  mortality and fertility were first collected in 1973, when the census
gathered  information on parity, child survival and date of most recent birth.
Vital registration in Colombia has been based in parish records
since colonial times. In 1938 a decree instituted  a compulsory vital registra-
tion procedure, but it was never fully implemented. New legislation in 1968
initiated  a second effort to build a national vital registration system. By
1978, the system was successfully operational in most of the country.
Seven national demographic surveys have been carried out during
the last three decades. In 1965 a morbidity survey initiated  the series,
followed by national fertility surveys in 1969 and 1976. In 1978 and 1980
knowledge, attitude  and practice of contraception (KAP)  surveys were
carried out. Finally, a nutrition  survey was held in 1981 and the Demo-
graphic and Health Survey was completed in 1986. Additionally, an older
antecedent exists with the  1963-64  Latin American metropolitan surveys,
which covered nine Latin American cities including Bogota.
Finally, the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadtstica,
DANE, has been carrying out a quarterly  survey in seven cities since 1976.
Although its focus is mainly on employment and other economic characteris-
tics, some demographic indicators can be obtained from these surveys.
B.- Mortality
Though data for calculations of mortality rates were gathered for
the first time in 1965, in the National Morbidity Survey, estimations of
rates  corresponding to previous years are available. Mortality has steadily
declined during the second half of this century. Nevertheless, most indica-
- 32 -tors for the last 25 years show that  the pace of the decline has been slowing
down. Infant  mortality, estimated at 150 deatLs per thousand births in
1950, declined to 81 by 1966 and 61 deaths per thousand in 1981, while it
was estimated  to be around  42 by 19902.
Table XI. Infant Mortality Rate and Expectation of Life at Birth. 1950-1990.
Infant Mortality  Child Mortality  Expectation of 1
Year  Rate  Rate  Life at Birth
l__________  l 1qox  1000  5qox 1000  eo
1950  150.0  222.2  45.0
1966  81.0  113.3  58.6
L  - 1981  60.9  85.9  62.1
1990*  42.2  53.4  66.5
Note:  L Projected.
Source:  Zlotnik (1982), Ochoa, Ordofiez and Richardson (1983). and Bulatao et al (1989).
Adult mortality, measured in expectation of life at birth (eo),  also
declined. The eo  was 45 years in 1950. By 1966 it had increased to 58.6
years and by 1981 to 62.1 years. Bulatao et al estimated it at 66.5 years for
1990.
The changes between 1966 and 1981 are particularly  well docu-
mented in Ochoa, Ordofiez and Richardson (1983). In an extended analysis
of differentials in mortality decline, they have shown that most advances
have been concentrated in the Central and Eastern  regions, especially in
Cali, where infant mortality declined by 60% in the period, while the decline
in poorer regions, (as the Atlantic) was much slower. In general, differen-
tials  of mortality by socio-economic  variables have increased. In rural  areas
infant  mortality declined from 95.3 deaths per thousand in 1966 to 81 per
thousand  in 1981, a decline of 15%, while in urban areas the decline was
from 76.4 to 53.5 per thousand, a decline of 30%. This resulted in a dramat-
ic increase of the differential between urban and rural  residents from 24.7%
2'The  1986 Demographic and Health  Survey (CCRP 1986) estimated infant  mortality  rates
(IMR) at  a much lower values and differentials.  Table 6.1 of the report shows an IMR of 33.0
for the period 1981-1986, with almost no urban-rural  differentials. DHS estimated  that  total
iFR declined  47%  in 10 years (between  1971-75  and 1981-86)  and 30%  in five  years (between
1976-80  and 1981-86).  These  values are suspiciously  low,  considering  other sources (such as the
World  Bank [19901,  Bulatao et. al. [1989],  or Ochoa  et. al. [19831),  and the historic evolution  of
these rates. Thus, for the purpose  of this study, they are disregarded.
- 33 -Table  XH. Infant  Mortality  Rate  by Residence  and  Education.
Region, Area  Infant Mortality Rate  1966-81
and Ed ucation  %/
and  Educatin  1966  1971  1976  1981 1
Region  l
Atlantic  67.35  64.11  59.81  56.56  -16.0
Pacific  95.26  92.81  90.37  89.19  -6.4
Central  97.71  85.67  74.11  61.95  -36.6
Eastern  77.49  68.48  60.88  53.48  -31.0
Bogota'  45.26
Area  of Residence
Rural  95.26  91.59  85.67  80.97  |_-15.0
Urban  76.37  68.48  59.81  53.48  -30.0
j  Education
None  103.86  100.15  95.26  91.59  -11.8
1 to 3 years  94.04  89.19  80.97  76.37  -18.8
4 to 5 years  75.24  66.27  54.51  46.28  -38.5
6 or more  54.51  47.31  39.11  34.19  -37.3
TOTAL  80.97  74.11  67.35  60.88  -24.8
.-
Note:  I Data for Bogota  is orliy available for the whole  period.
Source:  Ochoa, Ordofiez  & Fichardson,  1983.
to 51%. The effect of educational attaiment  has been more dramatic.  The
mortality of children of those with no education at all declined by only
11.8%, while that  of the children of women with 6 or more years of formal
education declined by 37.3%, increasing the differential from an already
large 90.5% in 1966 to an appalling 167.9%  in 1981.
As a consequence of this trend in infant mortality, the differentials
on expectation of life at birth also grew wider between 1966 and 1981. Most
of the gain in years of expected life were concentrated among urban, high
-34  -income and educated individuals. While the rural, the uneducated and the
poor gained between 2 and 3 years of expected life, the urban, the educated
and the rich gained between 4 and 5.5 years of expected life.
Changes in child mortality, that  is, in mortality of children under
5 years old, are important  for this study, since their  probability of surviving
is a main factor in the supply of children. Child mortality declined even
faster than infant  mortality. From 1950 to 1990, child mortality rates
declined by more than 75%. This means that 3 out of 4 children who would
have died in the early 1950s survive in the 1999s. In the 1950s, every
woman could expect that  one fifth of her children would die before the age
of 5. By 1990, only one twentieth of her children are at risk. No data are
available for differentials on child mortality, but we can expect that  they
followed the same pattern  that infant  mortality did.
The increase in differentials seems odd considering that  income
distribution  did not deteriorated but slightly improved and health  services
did not go through any particular  deterioration. An inverse relationship
between progressiveness in income distribution and differentials in expecta-
tion of life should be expected. Nevertheless, while distribution of income
was becoming more progressive, the differentials in mortality increased. In
analyzing this point, it is important to remember that  the categories ana-
lyzed are no static but highly variable. That is, important  "migration"
processes took place in the period under study. People moved from rural to
urban  areas and from less educated to more educated status.  These effects
could explain part of the increase in differentials. It seems logical to assume
that  those who stayed in rural  areas or were without education were
negatively selected. If that  was the case, the underlying process could have
been that  individuals more prone to improve their  socio-economic  and
health  status "migrated" to higher categories and rapidly improved their
situation, while those who had insurmountable obstacles to overcome stayed
in rural  areas, with low education and poor health. This trend in differen-
tial is probably showing a failure by the health  system to reach the most
needy households. While the system improved on average, most of this
improvement affected the urban and educated groups.
An additional element of importance is the rising role of violence
in Colombia. While in 1973 violence explained 2.5% of deaths, for a rate of
18.3 per hundred thousand, the increase in political and drug-related
violence has brought it to be, by 1986, the most important  cause of death in
Colombia. In that  year, almost 10% of all deaths were attributed  to "murder
or violence inflicted by other person".
- 35 -C.- Fertibty
1.- Levels and Trends
In the last 30 years, Colombia has gone through one of the fastest
processes of fertility decline in the world. The total fertility rate decreased
from over 7 in 1960-64 to 2.9 in 1987-90.
This decline was achieved through reductions in fertility at all
ages, but childbearing has been increasingly concentrated in younger ages.
Age-specific  fertility rates  for women aged 35 to 45 years, declined by 70%
in 30 years. On the other ha.nd, fertility at younger ages presents a slower
change. Age specific fertlity  r6tes for women younger than  25 declined from
165 births per thousand women in 1960-64 to 120 births  per thousand  in
1987-90, a reduction of only 27%.
Table Xm.  Age-Specific  Fertility Rates, Total Fertility Rate and Net
Reproduction Rate. 1960-1990
r*  ___Y  ___
Age 
1960-64  1967-68  1971-72  1975-76  1977-78  1981-86  1987-90
15-19  129  110  ill  94  74  78  70
20-24  299  210  257  212  213  181  166
25-29  337  278  241  221  182  171  148
30-34  304  277  193  172  138  121  99
35-39  230  176  141  132  102  79  63
40-44  98  85  90  53  40  30  22
45-49  10  10  0  31  8  9  3
TFlR  7.04  5.73  5.17  4.58  3.79  3.35  2.90
NRR  3.43  2.80  2.52  2.23  1.85  1.63  1.41
Mach 1 29.2  29A  28.6  29.0  28.2  27.8  27.5
Note: Mean Age at Childbearing.
Sources:  CCRP  (1977,1986,1990),  Zlotnik (1982)  and Ochoa.  Ordofiez  and Richardson  (1983).
- 36  -The change in the age pattern  is clear in figure VII. The rapid
decline in fertility for women older than 35 indicates that  a new behavior
was the main cause for the decline. Women now stop having children at a
younger age. In 1960-64, as much as 25% of the TFR was due to women
aged 35 or older. By 1987-90, this percentage had dropped to 15%.
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Colombia's fertility decline is even more impressive when com-
pared with other developing countries. Venezuela and Ecuador, the two
neighboring countries, had a smaller decline. Venezuela went from 6.1
children per woman in 1965 to 3.7 in 1988 while Ecuador decreased its TFR
from 6.8 to 4.2 in the same period. The decline in both countries was about
39%, a small amount if compared with the 53% decrease in Colombia.
The DHS analyzed a number of differentials in fertility. As
mentioned before, an important  determinant of these differentials is region
of residence. The total fertility rate for Atlantic Region's women was 4.39 in
1981-86, more than  1 over the national average. In contrast  to this, those
living in Bogota had a TFR of only 2.73. Once again, the role of poverty on
demographic behavior is clear. The Atlantic region has the largest  propor-
- 37 -tion of poor households while Bogota has the smallest, as measured by the
NBI index.
A more dramatic effect was produced by differentials in education.
Women without any education at all had an average of 5.4 children in 1981-
86, while women with tertiary  education had only 1.47. Finally, rural-urban
residence has also an effect, the total fertility rate  of women living in cities
was 2.76, while that  of women living in rural areas was as much as 4.88.
In order to consider the role of differentials on the fertility decline
process, we can compare the 1986 Total Fertility Rate with the number of
children ever born to women aged 45 to 49 in that  year. This last  figure is a
good indicator of the fertility levels about 20 years before the survey. As we
see in table XII, the overall difference is almost 39%. The most remarkable
differential is found in relation with the urban-rural  dimension. Urban
women reduced their fertility by 42%, to a low level of 2.7 children per
women, while rural  women's reduction was only 28%, broadening the differ-
ential from 31% to 44%. This figure has particular  relevance because it
indicates that the fertility transition is nearly complete in Colombian cities
and most of the future effort should be directed toward rural  areas.
Differences on the fertility decline by region do not appear  to be
high, the region with the largest decline was the Central region, with 45%
and the one with the smaller decline was the Eastern  region, with 32%.
Since the highest fertility region, the Atlantic, reduced its fertility faster
than the other regions, the differential between the highest and the lowest
fertility regions declined from 76% to 61%.
Finally, education has played a determining role in the decline.
With the exception of women with higher education, whose fertility rates
had been under replacement levels for some time, the decline was faster
among those with more education. Women with no education at all reduced
their  fertility by only 24%. Nevertheless, this figure may be misleading.
Educational attainment  of women has changed rapidly. While 45.5% of
women aged 15-49 in 1986 had gone to a secondary school, only 14% of
women aged 45-49 did so. In short, the effect of educational attainment  has
had two separate aspects. Differentials by educational level have declined,
though the change was small (the ratio of non-educated to highly-educated
women fertility changed from 3.9 to 3.6). On the other hand, the proportion
of educated women among the younger generations has increased rapidly,
making larger the groups with lower fertility.
- 38 -Table XIV. Total Fertility Rates 1981-1986 and Children Ever Born to
Women Aged 45-49.
Region, Area  Total Fertility  Children ever  Difference
and Education  Rate 1981-86  Born to Women  (t)
Region
Atlantic  4.39  7.40  40.7
Pacific  3.09  4.99  38.1
Central  3.05  5.47  44.7
Eastern  3.68  5.38  31.6
Bogota  2.73;  4.21  35.2
Area  of Residence
Urban  2.76  4.78  42.7
Rural  14.88  6.76  27.8
Education
None  5.39  7.12  24.3
Primary  4.16  5.62  26.0
Secondary  2.48  3.55  30.2
Tertiary  1.47  1.81  18.8
TOTAL  1  3.34  5.46  38.9
Sourc:  CCRP  (1988:40)
2.- Proximate Determinants
The proximate determinants  approach, presented  in the introduc-
tion of the paper,  lists the seven variables that  can affect fertility levels.
Availability of data for each determinant is far from being ideal. Bongaarts
and Potter  (1983) defined a "Standard Model" set of values of the proximate
determinants  of natural  fertility. In this standard,  women enter their first
- 39 -union at about 22.5 years, have their  last child at 40 years, go through an
infecund period of 1 year after a birth, have a mean waiting time to concep-
tion of 0.6 years and the effect of spontaneous abortion is very small. Also,
no contraception or induced abortion is in practice. Bongaarts and Potters
estimated  that  the total fertility rate of a society with this standard  will be
around 7.
The importance of the standard  model to this paper lies in the fact
that  the Colombian TFR was around 7 in the early 1960s. Thus, an analysis
of the levels of the proximate determinants  then and how they have
changed since, could be an extremely useful tool in understanding  fertility
decline.
a.- Age at First  Marriage and Marital Status  of Women:
Data from the 1976 WFS, the 1986 DHS and the 1990 DHS show
that  the median age at first marriage was 17.9, 20.8, and 21 respectively'.
Furthermore,  the 1976 WFS allows one to estimate the median age of
marriage of different marriage cohorts. That is, we can estimate the median
age at marriage for women married between 1951 and 1955, and so on. In
order to keep some degree of comparability between the different cohorts,
we estimate  the median age at marriage for those marrying before their
25th birthday.
The mean age at first marriage may be an important  variable for
the Colombian fertility decline. It was almost fixed between the early 1950s
and late 1960s, but it began to increase since then. Table XV shows a
difference of 3.1 years between the median in 1976 and 1990. This differ-
ence is indicating an increase in the age at marriage in the last 15 years.
Nobody can marry for the first time more than  once. Thus, a
change in the median age at first marriage must be a product of a change in
the behavior of the younger cohorts, those who have not married yet. When
considerng  the median age at first marriage by age in 1986 and 1990, no
a  These values are particularly impressive.  A change of three years in the Median  Age at
First Marriage  QMAY)  over a period  of 10 years (1976-1986)  is very fast. These data could  be
affected  by differences  in methodology  between the 1976  and 1986  surveys although no
differences  are mentioned  in the CCRP  publications.  Another possible  source  of this difference
could  be an error of measurement in one of the surveys.  Nevertheless,  both sources  have
independent indicators showing  that some change occurred.  The data on MAFM  by marriage
cohort,  collected  in 1976,  indicates that the median age had been increasing since the mid-
sixties, at least among  those marrying at younger ages. Also,  data on MAFM  by age at the time
of the survey, collected  in 1986,  show that the MAFM  increased almost two years between the
two younger cohorts surveyed.  In both cases, the differences  are underestimations  of the actual
changes occurring,  since no data of younger generations marrying later are used for these
estimations. Therefore,  it seems that the amazingly  rapid increase of three years in the MAFM,
as reported by the WFS  of 1976 and the DHS  of 1986 has actually happened.
-40 -Table XV. Median  Age at First  Marriage  (MAFM).
Median  Age  at Fust Marriage  by Marriage  Cohorts  (1951-1975)
of those  married  before  Age  25
YEAR  1951-55  1956-60  1961-65  1966-70  1971-75
MAFM,I  17.5  17.3  17.2  17.7  18.1
Median  Age  at First  Marriage  for Women  15-49  Years  Old
Year  1976  1980  1986  1990
MA1M  17.9  19.5  20.8  21.0
Median Age at First Marriage  by Age in 1986  AND 1990
Age  20-24  25-29  30-34  1  3539  40-44  45-49
1986  22.7  20.9  21.3  21.0  20.1  20.2
1990  na  21.5  20.8  21.5  20.9  20.1
Sources:  CCRP  (1977,  1981,  1988,  and 1991)
major  differences  are  observed  among  the  older cohorts.  However,  the
median  age, which  fluctuates  between  20 and  21 years  for those  older  than
25, was 22.7 years  among  those  aged 20 to 25 in 1986. Whether  this  is
showing  a significative  change  in  Colombian  marriage  patterns  is an open
question  and  will have  to be answered  in  future  research.  The median  age
at  first  marriage  of almost  the  same  cohort four years  later  was reported
closer  to that  of other  ages, suggesting  that  the  high  value  observed  in  1986
could be a measurement  error.
The percentage  of women currently  married,  either  legally or
consensually  did not changed  much.  54% of women aged 15 to 49 were
married  in 1964. This  percentage  dropped  to 53% in 1976 and  grew  to
53.5% in  1986. On the  other  hand,  the  proportion  of consensual  marriages
has  grown rapidly.  In 1964, only  19% of marriages  were consensual.  This
proportion  grew  to 27% in 1976 and  35.5% in  1986. Fertility  seems  to be
slightly  larger  among  legally married  women.  Data  from the  1973 census
show that  the  number  of children  ever born  to women age 15 or older  is
about  4.9 for legally  married  women and  4.5 for consensually  married
women.  While this  difference  of 0.4 children  is interesting  for an analysis  of
family  formation  patterns,  it is not very  significative  for a fertility  decline
-41  -analysis. Other things equal, this could only explain decline in the TFR of
about 0.1 children per woman.
Finally, an estimation of the proportion of women ever married
can be obtained by observing the percentages of single women at age 45.
The available data seems to indicate that  marriage, legal or consensual, has
been almost universal in Colombia for several decades 4. In short, marital
patterns  have had some changes over the last 25 years in terms of the
proportion legally married. However, this change should not have had any
serious effect on fertility levels.
b.- Postpartum  Infecundability
The length of the postpartum infecundability period is the second
most important  determinant affecting natural  fertility. Three factors affect
this determinant: amenorrhoea, abstinence and breastfeeding.
Postpartum amenorrhoea was estimated to last an average of 5.7
months and abstinence about 5.6 months among Colombian women in 1990,
with similar values in 1986. Although no comparable data is available from
the 1976 WFS, it is reasonable to presume that  these variables  did not have
major changes, especially in the case of amenorrhoea. Breastfeeding dura-
tion also seems to be very stable. The average number of months a baby
was breastfed was 11.3 months in 1976, 11.1 in 1986, and 12.7 in 1990.
Postpartum infecundability lasted an average of 8.5 months in 1986. Once
again, since the three mentioned factors did not experience major changes,
we can assume that  this determinant  did not experience any major modifi-
cation and, therefore, did not induced changes in fertility levels. Differen-
tials in length of the postpartum infecundability period by region of resi-
dence, urban-rural  location or educational attainment  were small. None of
these subgroups showed a period shorter than 7.4 months, none of them
showed a period longer than  9.8 months. Furthermore,  the longer periods
occurred among the lower fertility groups, as is the case of urban  or higher
educated women. In short, the available evidence suggests that  neither the
differentials nor the evolution of the postpartum infecundability period had
a significant role in fertility decline.
'  The problem  with this indicator resides in that the status of women  "divorced"  from a
consensual  union is not clear. They  tend to appear as single or divorced,  depending  mostly  on
the way the question is posed.  This problem  is common  in Latin American  surveys and
censuses, and the resultant data is, in general, very weak. About 15.7%  of Colombian  women
aged 35 to 39 reported themselves as single  in the 1976  WFS survey,  while 4.8%  reported
themselves  as separated or divorced.  Ten years later, among  women  of the same cohort, 4.6%
were single, 12.6%  were divorced  or separated. For these figures to be compatible,  two thirds of
the single women  aged 35 to 39 in 1976 should have married during the following  10 years and
almost exactly the same number should have divorced  in that period.  While that is not
impossible,  a most reasonable guess  would  indicate that most of the "single"  women  of 1976
were already separated or divorced  but misclassified  in the survey.
- 42 -c.- Natural  Fecundability, Spontaneous Abortion and Onset of Permanent
Sterility:
The last three determinants  of natural  fertility are the least
important in terms of potential effect on fertility.
Natural  fecundability of Colombian women, measured  through the
waiting time to conception, has been very close to the standard  value of
Bongaarts and Potter. The average waiting time to conception was estimat-
ed to be about 7 months in 1976 (UN, 1985, p. 8). While no comparable data
is available for any other date, there are no reasons to expect major changes
in this variable.
Intrauterine  natural  death rates were estimated  by Easterlin  and
Crimmins (1982) from 1976 WFS data. This survey indicates that  about 7%
of pregnancies ended in spontaneous abortion. Easterlin and Crimmins tried
to estimate  the effect of intrauterine  natural  deaths on the number of
children ever born using multivariate  analysis, but the parameter  they
obtained for this variable was non-significant. Nevertheless, we can assume
that each pregnancy lost to spontaneous abortion took an average of 7
months of waiting time plus 4 months of pregnancy and 3 months of amen-
orrhea. If this  simplistic estimation is correct, each lost pregnancy would
take  about 14 months. Thus, 7% of pregnancies lost implies that,  on aver-
age, about 0.1 years are spent in this stage per successful birth  interval.
Again, this value is very close to Bongaarts and Potter's  standard  of 0.15
years.
Finally, natural  sterility due to menopause is extremely difficult to
measure and has a high variability  from woman to woman. More than 48%
of married women aged 35 to 44 not using contraception had their last child
more than  4 years before the survey in 1976, a good indicator of sterility.
The equivalent figure for women aged 45-49 reached 83%. Age-specific
fertility rates of 1986 offer a good illustration  of the fast decline in fecundity
among women aged 40 and older. Fertility rates  of women aged 35 to 40
were about three times larger  than those of women 5 years older and ten
times larger  of those 10 years older. Of course, these figures could be affect-
ed by different rates  of contraceptives use in older age, but considering that,
as we will see later, rates  of prevalence of contraception decrease with age
for older women, this is a good indicator of the lower fecundity of women in
their 40s. In 1990, about 74% of women aged 35 to 39 were terminally
infertile, defined as women currently  married not using contraception and
without pregnancies for the last five years.
Although it is not possible to measure the mean age at end of
childbearing with precision, it is possible to estimate  the median age. We
know that  slightly less than  50 percent of Colombian women aged 40 to 45
and 80% to 90% of those aged 45 to 50 were not capable of conceiving due to
- 43 -menopause. Thu  he median age at end of childbearing should be around
45 years old.
The measure of the five proximate determinants  of natural
fertility indicates that,  following  Bongaarts and Potter  scheme, Colombian
women should have an average reproductive life of about 24 years in 1976,
from their  first marriage at 18 to the onset of secondary sterility at 42, and
of 21 years by 1986. However, Easterlin  and Crimmins indicated that
Colombian marriages  tend to last less than those figures. They estimated
that,  by 1976, the mean duration of marriages was 19.4 years, reducing the
actual time of exposure to childbearing by almost 5 years. An average birth
interval would last  2.15 years, consisting of 0.75 years of pregnancy, 0.7
years of postpartum  infecundability, 0.6 years of conception delay and 0.1
years added by intrauterine  deaths. Thus, 19.4 years of reproductive life
and 2.15 years-long birth intervals  should result in an average of 9 children
ever born per woman ever married.
Following the same logic, natural  fertility by 1986 should have
been around 7.7 children per woman. The decline would be explained mostly
by the change in age at marriage, which should have reduced the mean
duration of fertile unions from 19.4 to 16.5 years. No major changes in other
proximate determinants  were reported. Thus, a woman exposed 16.5 years
to an average birth interval of 2.15 years, would have had 7.7 children. The
actual  total fertility rate,  even during the early 1960s peak, was never much
larger than  7 children per woman. The difference of 2 to 4 children in the
1960s and 1970s, and about 4.5 children in the 1980s can only be explained
as the effect of fertility regulation.
d.- Proximate Determinants  of Regulated Fertility:
The difference between natural  fertility and actual fertility is the
result  of fertility regulation. Two forms of regulation are possible: contracep-
tion and induced abortion.
Data on induced abortion is scarce if not nonexistent. The 1976
WFS included a question on abortion prevalence, but its results  were not
published. A question about induced abortion approval was included in that
survey. While the answers were overwhelmingly negative (84 percent of
questioned women had a negative position towards it) this information does
not refer to the prevalence of abortion but to the psychic cost of using it.
Contraception use is well reported in Colombia. Two KAP surveys,
in 1963-64 and 1969-70, reported contraception prevalence in Bogota and
rural  areas, respectively. Also, the 1976 WFS and the 1986 and 1990 DHS
included information about this issue.
The growth in prevalence rates  has been dramatic. About 30% of
married women in Bogota and 15% of married women in rural  Colombia
-44-Table XVI. Percentage of Currently Married Women, Currently  Using
Contraception, by Age.
Age  1963-64  1978  1969-70  1978  1976  1978  1986  1990
Bogota  Urban  Rural  Rural  Total  Total  Total  Total
15-19  NA  28.0  NA  22.0  38.0  21.0  29.4  36.9
20-24  28.0  51.0  12.5  NA  52.0  42.0  56.8  64.6
25-29  34.4  56.0  15.9  36.0  56.0  51.0  68.9  66.5
30-34  85.5  65.0  16.0  NA  65.0  55.0  73.7  74.7
85-39  28.3  70.0  12.7  NA  53.0  55.0  75.8  76.9
40-44  NA  59.0  NA  25.0  45.0  49.0  70.4  74.3
45-49  NA  35.0  NA  NA  31.0  28.0  47.6  5  54.0
Sources: UN (1979), CCRP (1977) and CCRP (1988,1991).
were using contraceptives in the 1960s. These values grew to over 50% in
1976 and 65% in 1986 and 1990. The most rapid rise in use occurred among
women aged 30 to 40 years. Contraceptive use more than  doubled since the
1960s and increased about 25% between 1976 and 1986. Data from 1990
seems to indicate that a plateau may have been reached.
The most popular contraceptive methods in the 1960s were
rhythm, withdrawal and douche. When questioned about the methods they
were currently using, more than 90% of Bogotans and 70% of rural  women
using contraception reported to be using one of these three methods. This
question admitted multiple answers, and the totals  add to more than  100%.
Nevertheless, all other methods together (including pills, IUTD,  sterilization,
condoms and other) were reported by only 42% of Bogotans and 43% of
rural  Colombians (UN, 1979). By 1976, the preference had rapidly switched
towards the pill. Almost 34% of those using contraception were using pills,
and the second most popular method was the IUD, used by 19%. By 1986,
the use of pills had been reduced to 25% of the contraception users. This
was mainly caused by the increase in sterilization, used by almost 30% of
the contracepting population.
The rapid changes in use of and preferences for contraception are
the determining factors in explaining the decline in fertility. Contraception
has not only become more widely used, but the method mix chosen is more
efficient. Studies of contraceptive effectiveness show that,  on average, the
most widely used methods in the 1960s have a failure rate  of between 23%
and 40%, the most prevalent methods of 1976 have a failure rate of 2% to
5% and, among the most popular in 1986, the failure rate is between 0%
.45-and 2% (Hatcher et al, 1984). Since these figures correspond to U.S. users,
the actual effectiveness rates  for Colombia may be somehow different.
However, it is reasonable to assume that the relative effectiveness of the
methods (that  is, the fact that  the most prevalent methods of 1986 are more
effective than  those of the 1960s) is the same in the U.S. and Colombia.
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A.- The  SuDDlYr  of Children
The supply of children or potential family size in Easterlin's
framework has two components: Natural  Fertility and Child Survival. We
analyzed the levels and trends of natural  fertility in the previous section.
The available data suggest that natural  fertility has barely changed since
the early 1960s. None of its proximate determinants  (age at marriage,
postpartum infecundability, natural  fecundability, spontaneous intrauterine
mortality and secondary sterility) have had changes large enough to affect
the level of natural  fertility. Overall, we estimated its level at about 9
children per woman ever married.
However, child survivorship has had major changes. The probabili-
ty of losing a child before he or she is 5 years old was one in five in 1950.
This meant that  the final family size an average couple should have expect-
ed was about 20% lower than their  natural  fertility, that is, about 7.2
children. With the decrease in child mortality rates, the potential family
size began to grow. By 1966, it was about 8 children per women; by 1981,
about 8.2 and, by 1990, slightly more that  8.5 children per woman. These
values are very close to Easterlin  and Crimmins' figures. Using their
estimation method, based in a multivariate  regression, they estimated  that
the potential family size in 1976 was 7.9 children per woman.
B.- The  Demand  For Children
1.- Costs and Benefits of Children
The cost and benefits of children are central aspects of the de-
mand of children in Easterlin's  model. A straightforward  conclusion from
observing the model is that  a change in demand must occur at some point
before fertility can decline. Several scholars have pointed out that  the
trigger that initiates  fertility decline is a change in the cost of children,
which has an impact on parents' behavior. (Caldwell, 1982; Tan and Haines,
1984).
There are two types of cost of children: Direct costs and opportuni-
ty cost. Education is one of the most important components of children's
direct costs, while the missed potential income of both children and mothers
are the most important  opportunity costs.
Three factors, the introduction of compulsory schooling, a rise in
social pressures  to send children to school, and increases in cost of school
- 47 -and school-related goods are usually linked with rapid changes in direct
costs and, consequently, in fertility.
These factors have had different effects on Colombian fertility.
Five years of schooling, the duration  of the primary level, are compulsory in
Colombia. While attendance was never enforced, social pressures  and
cultural change made primary schooling almost universal since the early
seventies.
A major factor in the universalization  of education has been the
rapid urbanization  of the country. As we will see, the urban proportion has
been growing at almost one percentage point a year since the early 1950s.
This dramatic change exposed a large number of former rural workers to
the social pressures and needs of a urban environment, inducing them to
increase their "investments" in children, by sending them to schools.
The material  cost of primary education is borne largely by public
expenditure. Public schools are free and about 85% of the children go to
public,  schools.  Nevertheless, there are costs related to schooling, such as
books and writing supplies. Data for the largest four Colombian cities in the
late 1970s show that  families with children aged 8 to 18 years old spent
between 4.2 and 7.8 percent of their total expenditure on education. (Tan
and Haines, 1984)
Secondary schooling, though not compulsory, has also become
common in Colombia, especially in urban areas. The proportion of students
in private schools is much larger in this level, about 35% of the students
attending  secondary schools in 1984 were in private schools. Also, it is
logical to expect that  school supplies for this level will be more expensive,
indicating that,  overall, sending children to secondary school represents  a
larger  cost for parents.
The opportunity costs of children have effects in both directions.
One important  dimension is the loss of potential income generated by
universal  schooling. Since children are able to participate in economic
activities from a very early age, sending them to school limits the economic
contribution they might make to the household.
Mead Cain (1977) showed that  children in Bangladesh are eco-
nomically active since they are six years old and that they produce net
income to the family by age 12. No comparable data are available for Colom-
bia. It is clear that  the Colombian economic  structure is different from that
of Bangladesh, but as recently as the 1960s about 50% of the population
was rural.  Under such conditions, children played a measurable role in
household production, but with the rural-urban  migration process and the
universalization  of education, that  role decreased in importance.
-48  -Statistics  from censuses and surveys on participation in the labor
force are only collected for those aged 12 or older. Only 5% of the population
aged 12 to 14 was reported as active by 1978. This figure has been fluctuat-
ing between 5% and 10% since 1951, indicating that  children have not been
part of the labor force as a group in recent decades. Of course, the low
percentages of participation could also indicate a cultural disapproval
towards child labor, which would lead parents  to conceal the fact that  their
children were working. Peruvian data for 1986 show much higher children's
rates  of participation. More than  60% of children aged 10 to 14 were work-
ing in rural  areas. Among children living in cities, the lowest rate was for
girls in Lima, where 13.8 participate in the labor force, and the largest one
was for boys in other cities, with a figure slightly higher than  25%
(Cochrane et al, 1989).
A second cost of opportunity affects the income the mother could
earn if she spends the time used in childbearing and childrearing in the
labor market. This cost has rapidly increased for Colombian women. By
1964, about 17% of them were economically  active. This rate  almost doubled
in 20 years, to reach 31.6% in 1985. These values indicate than  Colombian
women are part of the production process and that retiring  from this
process, even temporarily, has become difficult and costly for them.
Finally, we should consider the benefits parents  can receive from
their  children's education. Individual returns  from education have been
found to be positive almost everywhere. Empirical analyses show that
return  to primary education in developing countries are high. In societies
where the families have strong links and parents  are usually supported by
their children in their old age, the advantages of educating children are
clear in the long run.
The effects of the mentioned changes of costs and benefits of
children are not clear. If parents do not expect to bear the full education
costs, the rise in education will not necessarily decrease the demand for
children. However, if educational goals increase beyond primary schooling,
and family links are weak, cost of schooling will increase while benefits
could decrease. This effects will reduce or make negative the net benefit of
education for parents,  and therefore, education will become an incentive to
reduce fertility. Also, the increased economic  activity of women has in-
creased the cost of having children. In short, it seems that  children have
become a more expensive "good"  and that  social and economical changes
have created incentives to reduce fertility.
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There are four basic sources of information about demand for
children: the 1963-1964 KAP survey of Bogota, the 1969-1970 KAP survey of
Rural Colombia, both carried out by CELADE,  the 1976 National Fertility
Survey, a part of the World Fertility Survey, and the 1986 Demographic and
Health Survey. Data on demand for children consist mainly of reports of the
number of children women would like to have.
No information about male preferences has been reported in any
of the surveys, and no information on the characteristics of the decision
making process inside the families is available.This could be of particular
relevance in a country with high differentials in family formation patterns.
For example, it is highly probably that  women's opinions have more weight
in the Atlantic region, where they have a predominant role in the house-
hold, than in the Central region, where families have a more patriarchal
structure.  Since fertility rates  are different between these regions by more
than 1.3 children per woman, it is reasonable to assume that  elements
internal  to the families have an important role in fertility decisions.
However, since the only available information refers to women's
desires and preferences, this section will analyze them assuming that  their
desires reflect family desires.
a.- Levels of Demand:
The total family size desired by Colombian women has rapidly
changed over time. The mean ideal number of children in 1976 was 4.11.
Ten years later, the number had dropped to 2.72, 33% lower. This decline
accompanied the decline of the total fertility rate,  which went, in the same
period, from 4.6 to about 3.3 children per woman. This implies that  the gap
between ideal family size and total fertility rates  has not been reduced, but
it has increased from about 12% to almost 20%.
The decline in the demand of children, represented  by the ideal
family size, is the result  of a combination of period and cohort effects. A
young group of women -those aged 15 to 24 in 1986- entered the group of
childbearing women, while those aged 40 to 49 in 1976 left the group. This
"cohort" effect, that  is, the replacement of one older cohort of women by
other younger, produced a strong decrease in the mean ideal number of
children. The women who finished their  reproductive life had a desired
family size of 5.3 children, while the youngest group in 1986 wanted just  2.4
children.
But an additional "period" effect was also present. Every single
cohort included in both surveys reduced its mean ideal number of children
during the ten-year period. In Figure VIII we can see that  this reduction
- 50 -was important; the largest change occurred among those aged 25-29 in 1976
and 35-39 in 1986, with a reduction of their  desired number of children by
0.68, almost 20%.
Figure Vm.  Desired number of Children by Age.
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Source:  CCRP (1977 and 1988)
These considerations have particular  importance because they
offer a hint of the mechanism of the decline in demand for children. Clearly,
the Colombian process was determined by both cohort and period effects:
Younger women have lower expected family sizes, and the desired family
size of all women declined over time. Thus, policies and research should be
oriented to all women, regardless of their  ages.
Although the KAP surveys of the 1960s did not report mean ideal
numbers of children, an estimation based on the proportion of women
declaring that they do not want more children indicated that  desired family
sizes were even larger  than in 1976.
The total percentage of women not wanting more children went
from somewhere between 70% and 60% in the 1960s to 60% in 1976, up to
- 51 -Table XVII. Percentage of Women not Wanting More Children, by Number
of Surviving Children.
Survey  Number of Surviving Children  Total
0  1  2  a  4  5 or +
1963464  KPN  NA  31.6%  51.9%  61.6%  83.7%  90.5%  70.6%
(Bogota)  I  __  _I_  _I_  _  __
1969-70 KAP  NA  13.0%  53.9%  64.9%  64.0%  77.3%  60.0%
R ural__  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
1976  WFS
Total  9.0% |  19.0%  5  52.0%  65.0%  79.0%  78.0%  61.0%
Urban  10.0% |  18.0%  52.0%  67.0%  81.0%  85.0%  60.0%
Rural  5.0%  19.0%  52.0%  59.0%  76.0%  70.0%  64.0%
1986  DHS
Total  7.7%  27.4%  67.7%  82.6%  91.7%  91.3%  68.9%
Urban  8.4%  28.7%  68.5%  85.5%  94.0%  NA  68.8%
Rural  6.5%  23.9%  65.0%  74.4%  89.0%  NA  69.2%
1990  DHS
Total  8.2%  23.1%  62.2%  85.9%  89.2%  94.0%  64.0%
Urban  2.2%  23.5%  64.8%  85.9%  89.8%  93.2%  62.1%
R_u_l  6.e0  21.7%  54.1%  85.7%  88.4%  96.0%  68.5%
Source: UN (1979), CCRP (1977,198 6, 1991)
69% in 1986, and down again to 64% in 1990. These erratic changes in the
indicator have two possible explanations. First,  the percentage of women not
wanting more children in Bogota in 1963-1964 is suspiciously high, reflect-
ing either  a mistake in the survey or a very peculiar characteristic of
Bogota's society by that time. Also, the change in the percentage of women
not wanting more children has a clear trend if we analyze the answers of
women with any specific number of surviving children. The proportion of
women not wanting more children increased rapidly in each group, especial-
ly among those with one or two children and between 1976 and 1986. This
is not reflected in the percentage for all women because the structure of the
population changed. Women with smaller families tend to be more willing to
have more children, and the proportion of women with small families has
- 52 -increased over time in Colombia. Thus, the real change in desired family
size is probably obscured by this compensating effect.
In general, demand for children has been declining in Colombia.
Information for the decade between 1976 and 1986 documents this trend
clearly. The period previous to 1976 is less clear, mostly due to the lack of
adequate data. A very important  point is that  the number of women not
wanting more children was already high during the 1960s. The reason for
this early desire for smaller families is not clear, further sociological  and
anthropological analyses should be conducted.
b.- Socioeconomic  Differentials in Demand for Children:
Several socio-economic  variables have been shown to have a role in
the determination of differentials in demand for children. Among those,
education, rural-urban  residence and region of residence are the most
significant in Colombia. The 1976 WFS indicate that  women with no
education wanted about 1.8 more children than that  of women who had
gone to tertiary  schools. This differential was reduced to about 0.7 children
in 1990. A similar effect occurred with the differentials by region of resi-
dence. The largest difference in 1976 was of 1.3 children, between women
living in the Atlantic region and women living in Bogota. This difference
was reduced to 0.5 children in 1990. The differential by rural-urban  resi-
dence is the only one that  was not significantly reduced, it went from 0.64
to 0.4 children in the 14 year period.
These changes can be explained by considering the stage in the
demographic transition  each group was going through. Bogotans, urban
women, and women with tertiary  education had a desired family size of
about or less than 2.5 children per woman in 1990. If we consider that  not
every woman has as many children as she wants, it becomes clear that
these values will generate a near-replacement fertility if contraception is
widely available.
We can say that ideal family sizes of 2.3 to 2.5 children are proba-
bly a "floor,"  further  reductions are highly improbable in a developing
country. Thus, differentials in desired family size will necessarily continue
to reduce, as long as the ideal number of children among the groups that
still have large demand continues its decline.
These findings have important implications for policy making. It is
clear that  different policies should be aimed to different groups. A large
campaign handing out contraceptive devices to everyone would be wasting
resources by trying to supply contraceptives to some social sectors, such as
highly educated women, whose demand for family planning is already
satisfied. On the other hand, spending on programs specifically designed to
reach the uneducated and those living in rural  areas or the Atlantic region,
would produce more satisfactory results, utilizing the available resources
- 53 -Table XVIII. Socio-Economic  Differentials in Demand for Children.
Ideal Family Size by Region of Residence
Year  Atlantic  Pacific  Central  Eastern  Bogota  Total
1976  4.64  4.26  4.23  3.74  3.32  4.11
1986  3.24  2.47  2.75  2.66  2.44  2.72
1990  2.90  2.40  2.60  2.70  2.40  2.60
Ideal Family Size by Rural-Urban Resi-
dence
Year  Rural  |  Urban  Total
1976  4.52  3.88T  4.11
1986  3.14  2.56  .72
1990  !  2.50  2.90  2.60j
Ideal Family Size by Educational Level
Year  None  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary  Total
1976  4.92  3.71  3.36  3.07  4.11
1986  3.44  2.93  2.42  2.32  2.72
1990  3.10  2.80  2.40  2.40  2.60
Sources:  CCRP  (1977,1988, and 1991)
more efficiently.
Easterlin  and Crimmins (1982) estimated the effect of different
socio-economic  variables on the desired family size. They found that  the
most important  variables were women's education, where each additional
year of education produces a reduction on the desired family size of 0.15,
and the region of residence, showing that those who live in the Atlantic
region have a desired family size of 1.65 children larger than those living in
Bogota.
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We have already shown that,  on average, demand for children is
smaller than  supply. This disequilibrium can only be balanced by the use of
contraception. By simply comparing averages of children's demand and
actual fertility from Tables XII and XVI, it is possible to see that  Colombian
women would like to have fewer children than  they have now.
Even if women do not want to further  reduce their final family
size, they may want to increase the interval between births. Thus, they
would need contraceptives for relatively short periods in order to avoid
pregnancy.
1.- Unmet Needs for Limiting Fertility
Women with unmet needs of family planning for limiting fertility
are those who, while being exposed to childbearing, do not want more
children but are not using contraception. Almost 16% of Colombian women
were in this situation in 1986. Of them, 75% (that is, 12% of all Colombian
women) were planning to adopt contraception in the future, making them a
particular  target  for any family planning policy. This group has the inten-
tion to use contraception but, for reasons that  go from family opposition to
lack of access to medical services, are unprotected.
Differentials in this matter  are large. The percentage of the
women with unmet need in the Atlantic region more than doubles that  of
the women residing in Bogota, where only 11% of women are in this catego-
ry. Educational differentials are more marked. While 26% of women with no
education at all have unmet needs for family planning, only 1.2% of women
who went to the tertiary  level are in that  situation.
The unmet needs are, in general, larger among those groups with
larger fertility. Again, this is indicating that targeting is critical for any
program if it will succeed. An analysis of the reasons why as many as 25%
of the women who said that  they did not want more children neither use
nor plan to use contraceptives is extremely important, especially when this
percentage goes as high as 39% in some groups.
2.- Unmet Needs for SDacine Fertility
A second type of unmet needs exists when women want to space
their  children's births, but they do not use family planning. This indicator
- 55 -presents the percentage of women who want to delay the birth  of their  next
child for more than two years and are not using any family planning
method, among all exposed women. The figures in this case are smaller,
only 12% of Colombian women are in this situation, and the percentage who
plan to use contraception in the future is also smaller, only 66%.
Table XiX Percentage of Women  With Unmet Need for Family Planning, by
Region, Urban-Rural Residence and Education. Colombia 1986.
Region,  Percentage with unmet need  Percentage who plan  to use among
Residence  with ummet need|
and  Educa-  To Stop  |  To Space  Total  To Stop  |  To Space  Total
tion  [Tomnmm  -tp_~  _t  I  L  --  Toa
Region  . _
Atlantic  23.4  17.7  41.1  75.7  71.2  73.7
Pacific  15.5  10.6  261  69.9  60.4  65.9
Central  14.6  10.6  25.2  74.9  61.0  69.0
Eastern  14.1  13.3  27.4  74.6  70.0  72.3
Bogota  11.1  9.4  20.5  82.6  68.3  76.1
Residence
Urban  1  13.3  10A  23.7  73.7  64.6  69.6
Rural  21.8  16.2  _  37.5  76.9  68.7  73.6
Education  _
None  26.2  8.6  34.8  61.4  60.9  61.5
Primary  17.4  12.1  29.5  74.0  62.6  69.2
Secondary  12.1  13.5  25.6  85.2  73.5  78.9
Tertiary  1.2  131  14.3  100.0  70.7  72.7
Total  |  15.9  |  12.3  |  28.2  7  .8  66.4  71.3
Source: CCRP, 1988
While the differentials by region of residence and by rural-urban
residence are basically identical to those of the unmet needs of family
planning to limit fertility, they reverse in the case of education. The signifi-
cance of this effect should be considered with caution. Indeed, 13.1% of all
highly educated women have unmet needs for spacing, against only 8.6% of
those with no education. But these percentages are determined by the
- 56 -proportion of women wanting to space births. If we only consider this new
reduced population, then we will find that  25% of highly educated and as
many as 58% of uneducated women have unmet needs.
In conclusion, about 28% of Colombian women were in need of
family planning services in 1986. More than  71% of them declared their
willingness to use contraception in the future. Women in the Atlantic region
and with no education were the groups with the highest needs, with 41%
and 35% respectively. These indicators show that  demand for children is
clearly below the current  level of fertility and that,  in terms of the
Easterlin-Crimmins  framework, a strong motivation to control is present.
The regulation costs, both psychic and market types, are a major variable in
the determination  of regulation use and, consequently, in the level of
fertility.
- 57 -VL. RegMlation Costs
According to Easterlin framework, when demand for children is
smaller than  supply, a motivation to control fertility is present. We had
shown that  this has been (and still is) the case for Colombia since the
1960s. Nevertheless, the existence of that motivation, or "unmet need" to
control fertility, is not enough to guarantee  that  contraception will be used
and fertility will decline. Availability of contraceptives is a critical aspect of
this process. To adequately assess this availability, we will consider the
"psychic"  and "market" costs of fertility control.  By psychic cost, we refer to
the non-material obstacles women can find when attempting to use contra-
ception. Among them, family pressures,  community disapproval or religious
beliefs are very important.  By market costs, we refer to the material  obsta-
cles women have to confront. These includes items such as the cash cost of
medical visits and contraceptive devices, and the cost of transportation  to
family planning clinics.
A.- Psychic  Costs. The Culture  of Control.
The estimation and assessment of psychic costs of fertility regula-
tion in Colombia are open questions, worthy of detailed analysis. Colombia's
case has been analyzed in many studies on the economics of fertility decline
or the demographic processes, but, unfortunately, anthropological studies
are practically nonexistent. A few studies on social and cultural attitudes
towards contraception have been published.
Family planning programs have encountered resistance from
opposite sides. As mentioned before, the Catholic hierarchy did have an
active role resisting the introduction of family planning in the 1960s. On the
other side, leftist groups strongly campaigned against  the newly introduced
programs. In a book called "Natality Control is: Violation of National Sover-
eignty and Colombian Families Rights", Celiano Padilla C6spedes, describes
the attempts  to lower fertility rates in Colombia as ". . . A form of violence
with fatal  consequences  for our marginal classes. [ Its promoters goals are]
to perpetuate their control and exploitation of the Colombian people and
[...J the U.S. imperialism. . ." [Padilla Cespedes, 1974:1071.
The religious and political opposition does not seem to have
affected acceptance. Table XX shows that frequency of attendance at mass,
which could be regarded as a good proxy for religiosity, did not have the
expected negative effect on the willingness to adopt contraception in the
early sixties.
- 58 -Data at individual, household and community levels are scarce
and not informative. The 1986 DHS indicated that  less than 5% of women
with "unmet needs" said that their  main reason to avoid contraception was
their  husband's  opposition, while less than  4% claimed to be against  family
planning.
Table XX. Use of Contraception by Religious Practice. Bogota 1964.
Frequency of Attendance  Use of Contraception
to Mass  Currently  Using  Ever  Used
Once a Week or more  31.6  40.0
Once a Month or more  29.5  36.0
Less than  Once a Month  25.8  36.0
Source:  Novoa,  A. (1974:66)
Psychic costs seems to be negligible at this time and, more impor-
tantly,  they never were a pivotal aspect of the decision.  to adopt family
planning.  This view questions the real power of the Catholic church in
Colombia. Colombians consider themselves to be Catholics and they proba-
bly practice their religion more than in any other Latin American country.
Nevertheless, for reasons that  should be further studied, they were not
influenced by the church's doctrine in regard to their  reproductive behavior.
B.- Market Costs. Familyr  Planninst Programs  and Policies
The market costs of family planning in Colombia have been
directly linked to government policies and non-governmental organizations
programs. Supply of contraceptive devices through private doctors or drug-
stores has been limited to less than 40% of the population, although it has
increased over the last decade. The largest part of the supply of contracep-
tives has been covered by the government, directly through hospitals or
indirectly through the social security system, and Profamilia, a non-profit,
non-governmental organization.




1978  1980  1986  1990
Profamilia  (NGO)  32.5  22.0  38.7  32.1
Public Hospitals  22.9  29.7  15.1  19.4
Social Security  4.5  4.6  3.9  5.7
Drugstores  34.5  35.6  33.3  28.6
Private  Doctors  3.4  6.7  7.7  11.2
Other  2.4  1.4  1.3  3.1
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: CCRP (1979,1981,1988,  and 1991).
1.- History of Policv
Colombia was one of the first countries in Latin America to
announce a national policy on population. In 1969, President Carlos Lleras
Restrepo issued a three-year development plan, which included a chapter  on
population policy. This document declared that  deciding the number and
interval of children is a basic human right  and, therefore, the government
has  to supply  the  people with  the  necessary  means  to exercise  this  right.  A
more conservative president, Misael Pastrana  Borrero, created a National
Council of Population in 1970. This council was required to propose popula-
tion policies and assist the government on population issues, but its action
was minimal and the role of the Colombian government during those years
was passive, neither encouraging the expansion of family planning services
nor limiting the action of private groups. It is important  to recognize that
even this noninterventionist  attitude  was uncommon in Latin American.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, most Latin American governments,
pressured  by the Catholic hierarchies and nationalist  groups, had a strong
position against family planning, making more difficult or directly impeding
the distribution  of contraceptives.
- 60 -2.- History of Programs
Family planning programs in Colombia have been, since their
early inception, almost exclusively monopolized by Profamilia. Profamilia is
a non profit, non governmental organization created in 1965. Its main and
explicit goal was to promote family planning. In 1966, it opened a pilot
clinic in Bogota, from where IUDs and contraceptive pills were distributed.
As a member of the International  Planned Parenthood Federation
(IPPF), Profamilia has received a continuous flow of international  assis-
tance. Based on this financial support, the group began an expansion
process, by 1990 its central program had 40 clinics around the country.
In order to reach rural  residents, Profamilia developed its "Com-
munity Program." This concept involves the recruitment  of community level
leaders to distribute and administer  contraceptives. This program has
enrolled as many as 3800 distributors  all over the country, including both
rural  and urban areas.
Profamilia's income is still mainly based on international  donors,
such as IPPF, USAID or UNFPA. Some local support is obtained through a
specially organized committee, and the nominal fees Profamilia always
charged for its services.
In 1973, with the aim of improving the financial situation, a new
social marketing program, called "Mercadeo  Social," was introduced.
Through this  system, Profamilia began to sell contraceptives at market
prices. By 1974, the three programs  (Clinics, Community and Mercadeo),
distributed 65% of all contraceptive pills and almost 100% of condoms sold
in Colombia. In 1986, the Community Distribution and Mercadeo Social
programs were merged, consolidating both distribution  structures.
a.- Methods Offered:
The Profamilia programs started  offering contraceptive pills and
IUDs. Early in 1970 Profamilia created a program of male sterilizations, but
this program was canceled because of the low number of clients. A female
sterilization program began in 1973 with a growing acceptance among the
users. An additional program called "Programa Quirdrgico M6vil"  was
organized to reach isolated areas and offer sterilizations. A surgical team,
completely equipped, would travel to this areas and perform the steriliza-
tions in one or two days, leaving the patients  to the care of local doctors or
midwifes afterwards.
The increasing popularity of sterilizations relegated the use of
IUDs to a third place in the mid 1970s and the pill to a second place around
1985. As of 1990, the most popular method was sterilization, followed  by the
- 61 -pills and  IUDs. Other  methods,  such  as the  rhythm,  withdrawal,  condoms,
or vaginal  methods  such  as diaphragms  had  a much  lower popularity,  with
less than  10% prevalence  rate  for any  of them.
Table  XXII. Women Contracepting  by Type of Contraceptive  Used.  Colombia
1976 to 1990.
Year  % Supplied
Method  by
1976  1978  1980  1986  1990  Profamilia
i............j  1.........j  1  1  (1990)
Pill  37.6  36.8  35.4  25.4  21.2  53.0
Sterilization  11.6  17.5  21.6  29.0  32.7  70.0
IUD  13.2  16.8  17.0  17.2  18.6  18.0
Condom  . 2.9  2.3  2.5  4.3  43.0
Vaginal  ----  4.8  4.4  4.1  2.5  25.0
Injectable  ----  2.7  2.8  3.6  3.5  0.0
Rhythm  14.0  8.5  10.4  8.5  9.3  0.0
Withdrawal  11.6  8.6  5.2  8.2  7.0  0.0
Other  2.0  1.3  0.4  1.5  0.8  0.0
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  51.0
NOTE:  1 Estimated.
Sources:  CCRP  (1981,1986,  and  1991)  and  Trias (1990).
3.- Current  Access to Family  Plannin
As of 1990, Profamilia  estimates  that  70% of women at  risk  are
using  some form of contraception,  an increase  of about  five percentage
points  since the  1986 DHS. Of these,  almost  one third  have  been  sterilized,
while  the  pill is still  preferred  by 21%. Considering  all modern  family
planning  methods  (that  is, excluding  rhythm  and  withdrawal),  Profamilia
provided  services  to 61% of all contracepting  women.
Family  planning  is currently  available  to almost  every  Colombian
woman.  The number  of women with  unmet  needs  is still  considerable,  in
1986  about  28% of at risk  women indicated  that  they  were in need  of some
- 62 -kind  of family  planning  service,  but  only 6.1% of them  said that  their  were
not  using  contraceptives  because  of high  costs  or accessibility  problems,  two
reasons  connected  with  the  efficiency of the  family planning  programs.
Thus,  less  than  2% of at  risk  women indicated  that  the  Colombian  family
planning  programs  were not  useful  for them.  In short,  it is clear that  the
programs  offered by Profamilia,  together  with  the  smaller  governmental  and
private  services  can be considered  as extremely  successful  attempts  to
supply  a full nation  with  family  planning  services.
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Colombian  women had  a relatively  low demand  for children  early
in the  1960s. This  fact has  been a critical  element  in  the  successful  history
of family  planning  in  Colombia, as the  opposite  may have  been  a major
cause  of failure  of programs  in  other  countries.  By 1976 the  average  desired
final  family  size was of 4.11 children,  about  11% lower than  the  actual  total
fertility  rate.  While no exact data  are  available  for previous  years,  the  rapid
acceptance  of family  planning  services  in the  early  1970s indicates  that
demand  for children  was low by that  time.  Actually,  the  total  fertility  rate
declined  by 10%, from 7.04 to 5.73, even before the  Profamilia  project  was
initiated,  showing  that  Colombia was already  in its  fertility  transition
process.
Several  economic and  social processes  accelerated  the  increase  in
demand  to reduce  fertility.  Among them,  urbanization  and  educational
improvements  were the  most influential.  The early  CELADE KAP surveys
indicated  that  urban  residents  wanted  fewer children  than  their  rural  coun-
terparts.  This  differential  endured  over almost  30 years,  and  it is reasonable
to expect  that  it will not disappear  in the  near  future.  A similar  effect can
be observed  with  educational  differentials,  which have  slightly  decreased
between  1976 and  1986. These  persistent  differentials  had  a critical  role in
the  changes  in children's  demand,  since dramatic  changes  in  rural-urban
distribution  and  educational  attainment  have  been documented  since 1960.
Urban  population  grew  from 38% in 1951 to 67% in 1985, and  gross  second-
ary  enrollment  went from under  15% in  1960 to almost  50% in 1985.
Additionally,  demand  for children  declined  among  urban  and  educated
individuals,  enhancing  the  effect of these  differentials  on fertility.  While it
is not possible  to quantitatively  determine  the  effect of these  changes  on the
fertility  decline, it does not  seem to have been important.
Another  major  factor in the  fertility  decline  was the  low cost of
regulation.  Psychic costs  were low even before the  decline began.  The causes
of this  are  not  clear, though  a sensible  hypothesis  could be that  the  Catholic
church  did not have  as  much  influence  on personal  behavior  as it was
expected.  Also, cultural  patterns  did not oppose changing  and  modernizing
behavior,  but  actually  encouraged  them.  Thomas  Merrick  [1990] hypothe-
sized that  a major  conduct  for the  ideational  change  mentioned  by Cleland
were the  media,  especially  through  soup operas  promoting  small families
and  female  role models with  fewer  children.  Whether  this  hypothesis  is
correct  or not,  Colombian  women did decrease  their  ideal  number  of chil-
dren  rapidly.  The deeper  causes  of this  phenomenon  should  be further
studied  by anthropologists  and  sociologists.
Market  costs, which were high  in the  early  1960s, decreased
rapidly  with  the  creation  of Profamilia.  The merits  of Profamilia  in making
- 64 -contraception  available  to almost  every woman in  Colombia  are  undisputa-
ble. By the  time  Profamilia  was created,  Colombian  women were  confronted
with  a strong  demand  to limit  the  number  of children  and  very  low psychic
costs.  In other  words, inexpensive,  easily available  contraceptive  devices
was the  only ingredient  missing  to produce  a rapid  fertility  decline. Pro-
familia  and  the  government  took the  responsibility  for supplying  the  family
planning  services,  and  did it efficiently, facilitating  the  decline  of fertility.
Its  role in  Colombia's  fertility  transition  was very important,  but  not  as
much  as both  its  supporters  and  detractors  usually  suggest.  Fertility  in
Colombia was declining before Profamilia,  and  would have  continued
declining  without  Profamilia.  The social, economic and  cultural  forces
behind  this  decline  were enhanced  by Profamilia's  activities,  but  they  were
not  created  by Profamilia.
A major  conclusion from this  study  is that  social processes  are
rarely  created  by policy. Governments  or NGOs can  try to  encourage  or
slowdown them,  but  if the  social climate  is not supportive,  there  is no
possible  change  in  individual  behavior  (unless  extreme  penalties  are  im-
posed to those  who deviate  from the  official policy, as was the  case of
China).  In terms  of fertility  transition,  a major lesson  from the  Colombian
case is that  the  best  managed  family  planning  program  will succeed only in
a context  where  exists  strong  excess  of supply of children  and  low psychic
costs of fertility  control.
In  relation  to the  regional  situation,  it seems plausible  to think
that  most Latin  American  countries  have had  a socio-economic and  cultural
evolution  similar  to that  of Colombia. Rates  of urbanization  and  educational
improvement  have been  high  in  almost  every country.  There  is no reason  to
expect  higher  psychic  costs in  other  Latin  American  countries.  In fact, it
should  not be surprising  if other  countries  present  even less individual
resistance  to adopt  family  planning,  since the  major  opposition  force in  the
region,  the  Catholic  church,  is generally  stronger  in Colombia than  in  any
other  Latin  American  country.  Perhaps  the  most significant  difference
between  Colombia and  other  countries  has  been the  presence  of Profamilia
and  the  attitude  of the  government,  which,  while  not encouraging  the  use of
contraceptives,  did not  obstruct  the  labor of private  organizations.
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